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PREFACE 
Each year, the Directorate-General for Regional Policies of the Commission of the European 
Communities launches a number of studies in the field of Regional Policy and Regional Plan-
ning. These studies mainly aim at providing a basis for policy formulation internally, as well as 
the preparation of programmes and initiatives and a basis for analysing the impact of current or 
planned activities. The most interesting or innovative of these will now be published in a series 
entitled 'Regional Development Studies'. With this series the Directorate-General hopes to stim-
ulate discussion and action in a wider sphere on the research results received. The publication 
of the studies is addressed to politicians and decision-makers at European, regional and local 
level, as well as to academics and experts in the broad fields of issues covered. 
It is hoped that by publicizing research results the Commission will enrich and stimulate public 
debate and promote a further exchange of knowledge and opinions on the issues which are 
considered important for the economic and social cohesion of the Community and therefore for 
the future of Europe. 
Readers should bear in mind that the study reports do not necessarily reflect the official position 
of the Commission but first and foremost express the opinion of those responsible for carrying 
out the study. 
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Community Regional Policy is aimed at reducing socio-economic 
disparities between regions by promoting the economic development of 
lagging regions and the reconversion of industrial areas in decline. 
The size and composition of population and their long-term 
developments are key variables in a region's development potential. 
Developments in these variables also determine inter alia regional job 
requirements and infrastructures needed. 
The third periodic report on the situation and development of 
regions demonstrated that demographic developments constitute an 
important determinant of labour force growth. These developments 
varied substantially among regions through the 1980s and will continue 
to do so in the 1990s and probably also in the more remote future. For 
that reason an insight into future long-term demographic trends on the 
regional level is a requirement of an efficient and forward-looking 
regional policy. 
For some Member States, population projections on the regional 
level have been made, often by means of elaborate demographic models. 
As these projections are based on different assumptions and use 
different elements, they are not comparable, the less so because their 
time horizons also vary. For some countries, no projections are 
available at all. 
In 1985/1986 a study was carried out by the Netherlands Economic 
Institute focusing on population and labour-force projections on the 
regional level. These projections have been obtained by using the 
projection model DEMETER that treats all countries in the same way and 
on the basis of the same set of elements and assumptions. The present 
report serves as an updating of the previous results and gives 
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projections for 164 regions in the EC-12. The base year is 1985, 
the most recent year for which sufficiently detailed and reliable data 
for all countries are available. The projection period covered is 30 
years i.e. up to 2015. 
2. Method 
2.1. Two layers 
The ultimate aim of the Demeter project is the projection of 
regional population developments for which the national projections 
serve as a framework. The analytical advantages of this two-layer 
approach are two-fold. First, by fitting the regional projections 
within the national total, the consistency of the system is 
guaranteed. Secondly, on the national level, statistical sources are 
much more satisfactory and reliable and produce more detail. This 
implies, however, that for both layers essentially the same procedure 
has to be followed using only information available on both the 
national and the regional levels for all countries. 
2.2. Projections on the national level 
The point of departure for the projection on the national level 
is the initial population at time t split up in males and females and 
divided into 5-year age brackets. The choice for 5-year age brackets 
had to be made because on the regional level no more detailed 
population data could be gathered. The implication is that projections 
1) There are currently 176 level II regions of the Community 
following a marginal revision to the Nomenclature of territorial 
units (NUTS) published in November 1989. For data availability 
reasons the present forecasts of population and labour force are 
based on the former situation. 
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can only be made for five-year periods, during which each population 
cohort just moves into the next group. 
The elements constituting the course of future national 
population developments are death, birth and international migration. 
Death rates in the developed world of Western Europe show some 
variance over time but are in general fairly stable. Therefore these 
rates have been assumed to remain stable at the levels prevailing in 
the base year 1985. 
Unlike death rates, fertility rates are marked by a non-stable 
pattern. For this reason, two variants have been developed. The 
'stable fertility' variant assumes that age-specific fertility rates 
of 1985 are supposed to be maintained. The 'projected fertility' 
variant features non-stable age-specific fertility rates. This second 
variant served as a framework for the regional part of the study. 
As to international migration, the assumption is made that in 
line with recent observable developments net migration in the 
countries of the EC will be as close to zero as to be negligible. As 
this might seem a rather strong assumption it must be pointed out, 
that at the prevailing low levels of international migration, future 
developments are highly determined by mortality and fertility patterns 
of the present population. However, two exceptions were made to the 
decision to ignore international migration. The first one regards 
Germany and was due to political changes in East-European countries 
leading to a great number of inhabitants emigrating to West-Germany. 
For the period 1985-1990 this number amounts to 1.172.000 people of 
which 460.000 from the DDR and 712.000 from other East-European 
countries. Related to the total population of West-Germany this means 
a growth of about 2X. The second exception concerns Ireland. Already 
for a number of years this country has been characterized by a 
considerable outflow of people. For both countries the decision was 
taken to consider only the international migration occurring during 
the period 1985-1990. For the 1990-2015 period the non-migration 
option was re-introduced. 
The projection method is schematized in figure 1. 
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2.3. Projections on the regional level 
The projection method for regional population is essentially the 
same as the one on the national level with one important addition. 
Interregional migration plays a large role in the development of 
regional population, so it had to be explicitly taken up in the model. 
The set-up is given in figure 2. 
As regional death and fertility rates are not the same for all 
regions nor the same as the national figures a method has been 
developed to generate them. By applying the national death and 
fertility rates to the relevant regional population age groups a 
theoretical figure can be calculated for total death and total birth 
at time t. Comparing this figure to the observed reality a regional 
factor is derived which is used to make a correction for each region 
on the national death- and fertility rates. These rates then are used 
for the projection of the natural movement of the regional 
populations. 
For interregional migration a submodel was developed, based on 
the concept of model migration schedules and taken up in figure 2. 
Interregional migration forms the most uncertain factor as it is 
not only determined by demographic and economic circumstances but by 
policy measures as well. Where on the national level the absence of 
migration tends not to have serious consequences for the projection 
results, this is not the case on the regional level. 
The assumption was made that a stable percentage of each age 
bracket moves out of a region each year, thus making the total outflow 
dependent on the composition of the regional population. The spread of 
these outflows over other regions and thus the inflow by region is 
determined by the 1985 patterns. 
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3. National results 
According to the results of both fertility variants, in the long 
run each EC-12 country (with the exception of Ireland) will show 
declining populations. The extent of this decline is greater than the 
one projected for the same period in DEMETER 1986. In general, the 
stable fertility variant produces slightly higher population figures 
than the variant based on projected fertility. In table 1 annual 
average rates of growth are presented for two successive periods 
(based on projected fertility). 



















































































































































Apparently, after the year 2000 all EC-12 countries (except 
Ireland) will be confronted with negative population growth rates. If 
recent migratory movements in Germany (inward) and Ireland (outward) 
continue, perhaps at a somewhat reduced rate, this will imply some 
overestimation of the Irish population and some underestimation of the 
German population in the present forecast. 
An important implication of declining or even slow growing 
populations is the shift in the population composition toward higher 
age groups. In all EC-12 countries the share of the young in total 
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population will decline in favour of the old. For the EC as a whole 
this means that 0-14 year olds constitute 15% of total population in 
2015 vs. 20% in 1985. The percentage of the group 15-59 remains stable 
at 61%, but within this group the upward shift is clearly visible with 
those over 50, for example, increasing from 11,5% to 15,1% of the 
total population over the period. For some countries this shift to 
greying is more clearly in evidence as in others. 
4. Regional results 
The results of the national projections are highly reflected in 
the regional ones as the influence of national developments on the 
regions tends to be large. Nevertheless, population growth of decline 
within a country can vary strongly by region and thus cause a shift in 
the relative population concentrations. Map 1 shows the percentage 
change of the total population over the period 1985-2015 for all 
regions. As in this period the growth for the whole of the EC will be 
negative (-2.7%), the variance is quite large as shown in table 2, 
where growth for the top ten and the bottom ten regions is given. 
The regional variations of the population growth or decline 
within a country are for the greater part caused by the effects of 
interregional migration. To establish the influence of this migration, 
regional projections based on the assumption of no interregional 
migration have also been carried out. The results of both projection 
methods have been compared, leading to a set of migration index 
figures. Map 2 reproduces the outcomes. 
The map illustrates that especially in the metropolitan areas 
within Western Europe the outflow of population considerably outpaces 
the inflow, whereas coastal areas and regions with a tight 
labourraarket appear to be attraction areas. 
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Table 2. Regions with the most extreme population growth (positive and 







NISIA ANATOLIKOU AIGAIOU 
DEVON, CORNWALL 
MURCIA 
















































































Map 1 Population growth, percentage change 1985-2015 
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Map 2 Index interregional migration ef fect 2015 
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5. Labour force projections 
One of the main features regarding population developments is 
the effect on labour force and consequently on the number of jobs 
necessary to maintain an acceptable level of employment 
opportunities. For this reason national and regional projected age 
specific populations were translated into active population by the 
application of age specific activity rates. A projection of these 
rates on the long term is beset with many uncertainties but can give 
an impression of the size of the pressure of labour supply on the 
regional level. For the medium term it can be assumed that trends in 
activity rates can be foreseen rather accurately. 
A main issue for regional policy is the reduction of socio-
economic disparities between regions. One of the key variables in 
this context is the regional unemployment level. A growing labour 
force is in need of an equally growing job capacity to maintain at 
least the present unemployment and is in need of a faster growing one 
to reduce it. 
The present position of the regions in this respect can be 
assessed by combining the projected labour force growth for the period 
1990-1995 with the unemployment rate prevailing at the start of the 
projection period. Regional unemployment levels for april 1989 were 
2) 
calculated by Eurostat following the ILO concepts used for the 
labour force sample surveys. For the EC12 as a whole unemployment at 
the beginning of 1989 amounted to 9.3% of the active population. 
In table 3 the regions are grouped according to their 
positioning above or below this average and according to the projected 
labour force growth. Table 3A contains the regions with a projected 
labour force growth below the EC 12 average (0,25% per annum), whereas 
table 3B refers to regions with a growth above the average. 
As to the pressure for job creation one can have differing 
opinions. Either the choice can be for the primacy of diminishing 
2) Greece 1987 
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present unemployment levels, or the emphasis lays on the integration 
of newcomers on the labour market. A combination of the two is 
probably most effective. Ranking of the regions depends on the choice 
made. In tables 3A en 3B the regions are ranked first according to 
their position with regard to labour force growth and next to 
prevailing unemployment levels, both in relation to the EC average. 
Thus table 3A contains those regions where labour force growth 
is negative or below the EC average, while table 3B displays the 
regions with a higher than average labour force growth. It is clear 
that regions in the first column of tabel 3A are in a rather 
"favourable" position, while the last column of tabel 3B displays the 
regions in the most "unfavourable" position. For the columns in 
between the positioning is a matter of political choice. 














































































Dyment rate, 1989 
Unemployment 
WEST MIDLANDS -0.62 
LIGURIA -0.57 
BREMEN -1.22 
DURHAM, CLEVELAND -0.37 











X of EC population 17.7 2.9 
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Unemployment rata, 1989 
Unemployment < EC12 Unemployment > EC12 




























VEST FOR STOREBAELT 
DERBY-, NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 
ANTWERPEN 
OEST FOR STOREBAELT 
BRABANT 
GREATER MANCHESTER 









































































































X of EC population 20.4 6.1 
a) Unemployment rates of the regions in Greece refer to 1987 
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NORTH YORKSHIRE 
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PELOPONNISOS KAI DYTIKI 
CHESHIRE 
LINCOLNSHIRE 






































































































































































X of EC population 14.2 16.0 
BK/I1533sura 
- XVI 






DORSET, SOMERSET 1.14 
CAMBR., NORFOLK, SUFFOLK 1.19 
MADEIRA 1.49 
DEVON, CORNWALL 1.51 
NISIA ANATOLIKOU AIGAIOU 2.20 
LISBOA E VALE DO TEJO 0.91 
UTRECHT 0.98 















































































a) Unemployment rates of the regions in Greece refer to 1987. 
The table is graphically displayed in map 3, which clearly shows 
that the problem regions in this respect are scattered all over 
Europe, but that apart from Ireland and the Netherlands the 
Mediterranean countries are in the most vulnerable position. Of course 
the size of the unemployment at the starting point (1989) is of main 
importance. The real pressure in the projection period is not all that 
certain as apart from the projected growth of the labour force a large 
role is played by developments of employment opportunities. In general 
one can note that these tend to go in the same direction as labour 
force developments, a certain amount of interdependency being present, 
but that the size of employment growth is smaller, thus leading to 




Comparing the regional classification in the table to the 
situation in 1986 it becomes clear that most regions remain in the 
same category, especially where it concerns the extreme cases. 
Nonetheless a number of changes can be noticed. As the 
classification is based on two variables, labour force growth in the 
period 1990-1995 and the unemployment level at the start of this 
period, both can influence the position within the schedule. Moreover 
even when both factors remain unchanged, a change of position is 
possible as the classification is relative to the (changed) EC 
average. 
As a result a number of German regions have switched to a class 
with lower than average labour force growth. The same applies to some 
Greek regions. In about half of the Spanish regions projected labour 
force growth (in 1986 below average) now is higher than the EC 
average. For many of the UK regions the same phenomenon occurs, while 
in between unemployment in large parts of the UK has dropped below 
average. In most of the French regions the unemployment situation is 
worse than in 1986 and now above average, while in the Netherlands 
unemployment dropped considerably. Finally a few Italian regions show 
higher unemployment especially in the lagging parts like Abruzzi an 







Map 3 R e g i o n a l p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g j o b r e q u i r e m e n t s 
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La politique régionale de la Communauté vise à réduire les disparités 
socio-économiques entre régions en favorisant le développement économique 
des régions en retard et la reconversion des zones industrielles en déclin. 
L'importance et la composition de la population et les perspectives 
d'évolution à longue échéance en la matière constituent des variables 
essentielles du potentiel de développement régional. En outre l'évolution 
de ces variables détermine notamment les besoins régionaux en matière 
d'emploi et d'infrastructures. 
Le troisième rapport périodique sur la situation et sur le 
développement des régions a démontré que les évolutions démographiques 
constituent un facteur important de l'accroissement de la population 
active. Cette évolution a beaucoup varié d'une région à l'autre pendant les 
années 80 et il en ira de même pendant la présente décennie, et 
probablement au-delà. Aussi est-il nécessaire d'examiner les futures 
tendances démographiques à long terme à 1'échelon régional pour être en 
mesure de mener une politique régionale qui soit efficace et qui aille de 
1'avant. 
Pour certains Etats membres, des projections démographiques ont été 
établies au niveau régional, souvent à l'aide de modèles démographiques 
perfectionnés. Etant donné que ces projections sont fondées sur des 
hypothèses différentes et qu'elles n'utilisent pas les mêmes éléments, 
elles ne sont pas comparables, d'autant qu'il s'agit de projections à 
échéances diverses. Pour certains pays, on ne dispose même pas de 
projections. 
En 1985-1986, l'Institut économique néerlandais a effectué une étude 
mettant l'accent sur les projections en matière de population globale et de 
population active au niveau régional. Ces projections ont été obtenues à 
l'aide du modèle DEMETER, qui traite tous les pays de la même manière, sur 
la base des mêmes éléments et des mêmes hypothèses. Le présent rapport est 
une mise à jour des résultats antérieurs et il donne des projections pour 
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164 régions' dans la Communauté des Douze. L'année de base est 1985, 
c'est-à-dire l'année la plus récente pour laquelle on dispose, pour tous 
les pays, de données qui soient assez détaillées et assez fiables. La 
projection couvre la période de trente années qui s'achèvera en 2015. 
2. Méthode 
2.1. Deux strates 
Le projet Demeter est axé en définitive sur la projection de faits 
démographiques régionaux, les projections nationales faisant office de 
cadre. Sur le plan analytique, cette approche à double stratification 
présente deux avantages. Le premier est que l'adéquation des projections 
régionales au total national garantit la cohérence du système, et le second 
que les sources statistiques au niveau national sont beaucoup plus 
satisfaisantes et fiables et qu'elles vont plus loin dans le détail. Il 
faut toutefois, pour l'essentiel suivre la même procédure pour les deux 
strates en utilisant exclusivement 1'information disponible tant au niveau 
national que régional pour tous les pays. 
2.2. Projections au niveau national 
La projection au niveau national a pour point de départ la population 
initiale à l'instant t, subdivisée en individus de sexe masculin et en 
individus de sexe féminin et en tranches d'âge de cinq ans. Les tranches 
d'âge de cinq ans ont été retenues parce qu'il n'était pas possible de 
recueillir des données de population plus détaillées au niveau régional. 
Il en résulte que les projections ne peuvent être établies que pour 
des périodes de cinq ans pendant lesquelles chaque sous-ensemble de la 
population ainsi subdivisée passe d'une classe d'âge à une autre. 
Les éléments qui déterminent l'évolution future d'une population 
nationale sont la mortalité, la natalité et les mouvements migratoires 
internationaux. 
Il existe actuellement dans la Communauté 176 régions de niveau II à la 
suite d'une révision mineure de la nomenclature des unités territoriales 
statistiques (NUTS) publiée en novembre 1989. Pour des raisons tenant à la 
disponibilité des données, les présentes prévisions en matière de population 
globale et de population active sont fondées sur la situation antérieure. 
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Les taux de mortalité dans les pays développés d'Europe occidentale 
varient un peu au fil du temps, mais ils n'en sont pas moins généralement 
assez stables. Aussi a-t-il été posé en hypothèse que ces taux se 
stabiliseraient aux niveaux enregistrés pour l'année de base 1985. 
A la différence des taux de mortalité, les taux de fécondité se 
caractérisent par leur instabilité. C'est pourquoi deux variantes ont été 
élaborées. Dans la variante "fécondité stable", les taux de fécondité par 
classe d'âge enregistrés en 1985 sont censés persister. La variante 
"fécondité projetée" présente un scénario dans lequel les taux de fécondité 
par classe d'âge ne seraient pas stables. Cette seconde variante a servi de 
cadre pour la partie régionale de l'étude. 
En ce qui concerne les mouvements migratoires internationaux, 
l'hypothèse retenue, étayée par des observations récentes, est que les 
soldes migratoires nets dans les pays de la Communauté européenne seront 
proches de zéro au point d'être négligeables. Cette hypothèse pouvant 
paraître assez audacieuse, il convient de souligner que compte tenu des bas 
niveaux actuellement enregistrés en matière de migrations internationales, 
1'avenir dépendra dans une large mesure des taux de mortalité et de 
fécondité propres à la population existante. Il a cependant été dérogé dans 
deux cas à ce choix délibéré d'ignorer les mouvements migratoires 
internationaux. La première exception, relative à l'Allemagne, a résulté 
des changements politiques qui sont survenus dans les pays de l'Est et qui 
ont permis à un grand nombre de leurs habitants d'émigrer vers l'Allemagne 
de l'Ouest. De 1985 à 1990, le nombre des emigrants considérés s'est établi 
à 1 172 000, dont 460 000 en provenance de la RDA et 712 000 venus des 
autres pays d'Europe de l'Est. Rapporté, à la population totale de 
l'Allemagne de l'Ouest, cet afflux représente un accroissement de 
population de l'ordre de 2 %. La seconde exception concerne l'Irlande, pays 
qui se caractérise depuis plusieurs années déjà par une émigration 
importante. Pour les deux pays en cause, il a été décidé de prendre 
uniquement en considération les mouvements migratoires internationaux 
survenus dans la période 1985-1990. Pour la période comprise entre 1990 et 
2015, on est revenu au postulat "migration zéro". 
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2.3. Projections au niveau régional 
La méthode de projection utilisée pour la population régionale est la 
même, pour l'essentiel, que celle utilisée au niveau national, et dont elle 
ne se distingue que par une addition importante : les mouvements 
migratoires interrégionaux jouant un grand rôle dans l'évolution de la 
population régionale, il a fallu les intégrer explicitement dans le modèle, 
dont la structure est illustrée par la figure 2. 
Etant donné que les taux régionaux de mortalité et de fécondité 
varient d'une région à l'autre et qu'ils diffèrent aussi des chiffres 
nationaux, une méthode a été élaborée pour leur détermination. En 
appliquant aux classes d'âge considérées d'une population régionale les 
taux nationaux de mortalité et de fécondité, il est possible de calculer 
les totaux théoriques des décès et des naissances à l'instant t. La 
comparaison du chiffre en question avec la réalité observée permet 
d'obtenir par dérivation un facteur régional qui sert à opérer pour chaque 
région une correction fondée sur les taux nationaux de mortalité et de 
fécondité. Ces taux sont ensuite utilisés pour projeter le mouvement 
naturel des populations régionales. 
En ce qui concerne les mouvements migratoires interrégionaux, un 
sous-modèle a été élaboré sur la base de la notion des prévisions types en 
matière de migrations, sous-modèle qui a été intégré dans la figure 2. 
Les mouvements migratoires interrégionaux constituent le premier 
facteur d'incertitude, car ils sont déterminés non seulement par la 
conjoncture démographique et économique, mais aussi par les décisions 
politiques. Si l'absence de mouvements migratoires reste généralement sans 
conséquences graves pour les résultats de la projection au niveau national, 
tel n'est pas le cas à l'échelon régional. 
Il a été posé en hypothèse qu'un pourcentage stable d'individus de 
chaque tranche d'âge quitte sa région chaque année, d'où il résulte que la 
déperdition totale à ce titre est tributaire de la composition de la 
population régionale. La dispersion de ces déperditions sur les autres 
régions et donc l'apport de population par région sont déterminés par les 
données spécifiques de l'année 1985. 
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3. Résultats nationaux 
Selon les résultats des deux variantes retenues en matière de 
fécondité, tous les pays de la Communauté des Douze (sauf l'Irlande) 
verront à long terme leur population diminuer. L'ampleur de cette 
décroissance dépasse la régression projetée pour la même période dans 
DEMETER 1986. En général, la variante "fécondité stable" aboutit en matière 
de population à des chiffres légèrement plus élevés que la variante fondée 
sur la fécondité projetée. Dans le tableau 1, les taux annuels moyens de 
croissance sont présentés pour deux périodes successives (sur la base de la 
fécondité projetée). 

























































































































































Il apparaît qu'après l'an 2000, tous les pays de la Communauté des 
Douze (sauf l'Irlande) connaîtront des taux négatifs de croissance 
démographique. Si les récents mouvements migratoires enregistrés en 
Allemagne (immigration) et en Irlande (émigration) devaient persister, 
peut-être à un taux légèrement moindre, les présentes prévisions 
surestimeraient légèrement la population irlandaise et sous-estimeraient 
quelque peu la population allemande. 
Une conséquence importante du déclin ou même de la faible croissance 
d'une population est la croissance de la proportion de personnes âgées. 
- XXVI 
Pour l'ensemble de la Communauté des Douze, la proportion de jeunes 
diminuera alors que celle des personnes âgées augmentera : les moins de 14 
ans représenteront 15 % de la population totale en 2015 contre 20 % en 
1985. La classe d'âge comprise entre 15 et 59 ans reste stable à 61 %, mais 
on note un sensible infléchissement chez les plus de 50 ans, dont la part 
dans la population totale passe de 11,5 % à 15,1 % pendant la période 
considérée. Certains pays sont plus touchés que d'autres par ce 
vieillissement. 
4. Résultats régionaux 
Les résultats des projections nationales se reflètent largement dans 
les résultats régionaux, car les évolutions nationales influent 
généralement beaucoup sur les évolutions régionales. L'accroissement ou la 
diminution d'une population dans un pays peut néanmoins varier 
considérablement d'une région à l'autre et modifier du même coup les 
densités démographiques respectives. La carte 1 montre comment évoluera 
dans chaque région la part en pourcentage de la population totale pour la 
période 1985-2015. Comme il s'agit d'une période qui sera marquée pour 
l'ensemble de la Communauté par une croissance démographique négative 
(-2,7 % ) , on note des écarts importants illustrés par le tableau 2, qui 
indiquent la croissance pour les dix régions du peloton de tête et les dix 
régions les plus mal placées. 
Les variations régionales de la croissance ou du déclin démographique 
d'un pays tiennent en majeure partie aux effets des mouvements migratoires 
interrégionaux. Pour établir les effets de ces mouvements, on a également 
effectué des projections régionales fondées sur l'hypothèse dans laquelle 
lesdits mouvements n'existeraient pas. La comparaison des résultats 
respectifs des deux méthodes de projection a débouché sur une série 
d'indices de migration. La carte 2 donne les résultats de cette opération. 
La carte fait apparaître en particulier dans les grandes 
agglomérations de l'Europe occidentale que le nombre des départs l'emporte 
de beaucoup sur celui des arrivées, tandis que les zones littorales et les 
régions où le marché de l'emploi est étroit exercent un pouvoir 
d'attraction. 
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Tableau 2. Régions accusant les croissances démographiques (positive et négative) les plus élevées pendant la période 
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5. Projections en matière de population active 
Un des principaux aspects concernant l'évolution démographique réside 
dans l'influence que celle-ci exerce sur la population active et donc sur 
le nombre d'emplois nécessaires pour que les offres se maintiennent à un 
niveau acceptable. C'est pourquoi des projections nationales et régionales 
en matière de classe d'âge ont été rapportées à la population active 
moyennant l'application de taux d'activité spécifiques des classes d'âge. 
Une projection de ces taux à long terme est affectée de nombreuses 
incertitudes, mais elle peut donner une idée de la pression qui s'exerce au 
niveau régional en matière de demandes d'emploi. En ce qui concerne le 
moyen terme, il est permis de penser que les tendances relatives aux taux 
d'activité peuvent être prévues avec une assez grande précision. 
Un des principaux enjeux de la politique régionale est la réduction 
des disparités socio-économiques entre régions. Le taux de chômage régional 
constitue à cet égard une des variables essentielles. Une population active 
bo 






























en expansion doit bénéficier d'un marché du travail progressant au même 
rythme si l'on veut au minimum stabiliser le taux de chômage; il faut que 
le marché de l'emploi progresse plus vite que la population active pour que 
le taux de chômage diminue. 
Pour évaluer la situation actuelle des régions à cet égard, on peut 
combiner la croissance projetée de la population active pour la période 
1990-1995 avec le taux de chômage enregistré au début de la période de 
projection. Les taux de chômage d'avril 1989 ont été calculés par 
EUROSTAT(2), qui a suivi les principes utilisés par l'OIT pour les enquêtes 
par sondage portant sur la population active. Pour l'ensemble de la 
Communauté des Douze, le taux de chômage global au début de 1989 
s'établissait à 9,3 % de la population active. 
Dans le tableau 3, les régions sont regroupées en fonction du niveau 
où elles se situent au-dessus ou au-dessous de la moyenne précitée et 
suivant la croissance projetée de la population active. Le tableau 3A 
contient les régions où la croissance projetée de la population occupée est 
inférieure à la moyenne de la Communauté des Douze (0,25 % par an), et le 
tableau 3B vise les régions accusant une croissance supérieure à ladite 
moyenne. 
En ce qui concerne la nécessité de créer des emplois, les avis 
peuvent diverger. Le choix consiste à privilégier soit la réduction des 
taux de chômage actuels, soit l'intégration des jeunes qui arrivent sur le 
marché du travail. Il est probablement plus efficace de combiner les deux 
objectifs. Le classement des régions dépend du choix qui a été fait. Dans 
les tableaux 3A et 3B, les régions sont classées d'abord en fonction de 
leur situation en matière de population active et ensuite selon le niveau 
de chômage qu'elles connaissent, ces deux éléments étant rapportés à la 
moyenne communautaire. 
Ainsi, le tableau 3A présente les régions où la croissance de la 
population occupée est négative ou inférieure à la moyenne communautaire et 
le tableau 3B les régions caractérisées par une croissance de la population 
active supérieure à cette moyenne. Il est clair que les régions figurant 
dans la première colonne du tableau 3A se trouvent dans une situation 
plutôt "favorable", alors que la dernière colonne du tableau 3B regroupe 
les régions dont la situation est la plus "défavorable". 
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a) 
Tableau 3A. Situation des régions quant aux besoins en matière d'emploi 1990-1995 
Taux de chômage en 1989 
Taux de 



































































































% de la population 
de la CE 
17,7 2,9 
Tableau 3A. Sulte 
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Vest for Storebælt 
Deroy-, Nottinghamshire 
Antwerpen 
Øst for Storebælt 
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Greater Manchester 












































































































% de la population de la CE 20,4 6,1 
a) Les taux de chômage des régions grecques se rapportent è l'année 1987. 
mm^mu 
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% de la population de la CE 14,2 16,0 









Cambr.. Norfolk, Suffolk 
Madeira 
Devon, Cornwall 
Nisiä Anatolikou Aigaiou 











Taux de chômage en 1989 










































































% de la population de la CE 4.1 18,6 
a) Les taux de chômage des régions grecques se rapportent è l'année 1987. 
Le tableau a donné lieu à une représentation graphique (carte 3) où 
il apparaît clairement que les régions en difficulté dans le domaine de 
l'emploi sont réparties dans toute l'Europe, mais que si l'on excepte 
l'Irlande et les Pays-Bas, les pays méditerranéens semblent les plus 
vulnérables. Il va de soi que l'intensité du chômage pendant l'année de 
base (1989) revêt une importance extrême. La pression réelle qui s'exercera 
pendant la période de projection est des plus incertaines, car abstraction 
faite de la croissance projetée de la population active, l'évolution du 
marché de l'emploi joue un rôle considérable. Il apparaît d'une façon 
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générale que cette évolution va de pair avec celle de la population active 
ou du moins qu'il existe un certain degré d'interdépendance, mais que 
l'emploi progresse à un rythme moindre, d'où une pression accrue dans les 
régions où la croissance de la population active sera élevée. 
Si l'on compare le classement régional présenté dans le tableau à la 
situation qui existait en 1986, il apparaît clairement que la plupart des 
régions restent dans la même catégorie, surtout dans les cas extrêmes. 
Divers changements peuvent néanmoins être observés. Le classement 
étant fondé sur deux variables, à savoir la croissance de la population 
active dans la période 1990-1995 et le niveau de chômage au début de ladite 
période, l'une et l'autre peuvent influer sur les positions respectives au 
fil du temps. A supposer que les deux facteurs demeurent inchangés, la 
position d'une région peut se trouver modifiée étant donné que le 
classement s'effectue par rapport à la moyenne communautaire (évolutive). 
Un certain nombre de régions allemandes ont ainsi été rétrogradées 
dans une catégorie présentant une croissance de la population active 
inférieure à la moyenne. Il en va de même de diverses régions grecques. 
Dans la moitié environ des régions espagnoles, la croissance projetée de la 
population active (en 1986 inférieure à la moyenne) est à présent 
supérieure à la moyenne communautaire. Le même phénomène joue pour bon 
nombre de régions britanniques, car le chômage est entre-temps tombé dans 
le Royaume-Uni à un niveau inférieur à la moyenne. Dans la plupart des 
régions françaises, la situation de l'emploi est pire qu'en 1986, avec un 
chômage désormais supérieur à la moyenne, alors que le chômage a 
considérablement baissé aux Pays-Bas. Enfin, un petit nombre de régions 
italiennes voient le chômage s'aggraver,.en particulier dans des zones 
défavorisées comme les Abruzzes et la Molise. D'une façon générale, la 
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1 . INTRODUCTION 
1.1. General context 
A major objective of Community Regional policy is to reduce 
socio-economic disparities among regions located in the member 
countries of the EC-12. One way to realise this objective is by the 
optimum utilisation of indigenous resources. Size and composition of 
population are two of the most important factors of a region's 
indigenous development potential, for one thing because they have a 
significant influence on the size and growth possibilities of the 
regional labour force. There is indeed an urgent need to gain insight 
into the future development of population and labour force. 
In 1985 the Netherlands Economic Institute was approached by the 
Commission of the European Communities with the request to carry out 
projections of national and regional populations for all the member 
countries of the EC up to the year 2010, and to estimate how the 
projected demographic developments would affect the labour force and, 
hence, the job requirements. The ensuing study resulted in 1986 in a 
report entitled 'long-term regional demographic developments up to the 
beginning of the next century, and regional policy', which contained 
estimates, on a national and regional scale, of the population and 
labour force up to 2010, broken down by sex and five-year age 
brackets. 
Recently, the Commission requested our Institute to update the 
results of that study and make new projections up to 2015. To meet 
that request a two-stage study was undertaken, consisting of a 
national and a regional part. At the first stage the model (developed 
in 1985) was used to make projections on a national scale for all 
twelve EC countries on the basis of some specific assumptions. The 
exercise resulted in four sets of labour-force projections. One of 
these sets has been chosen to serve as input for the regional part of 
the model. During this second stage of the study population and 
labour-force projections had to be made on a regional scale. 
1.2. Contents of the report 
The present document reports on both stages. Chapter 2 up to 
chapter 6 refer to the first stage of the study, whereas in chapter 7 
to 9 the second stage of the study will be the subject of attention. 
Chapter 2 gives a short description of the part of the model 
used for the demographic projections on the national scale. The three 
input factors, and the differences between them in two projection 
variants, will be discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the 
results of both sets of projections, pointing out where the two differ 
and how they compare with the results obtained in 1986. The chapters 5 
and 6 resemble the previous ones in structure, but are focused on 
labour-force figures. Unlike the demographic projections, labour-force 
projections contain only one variable that can be manipulated, namely, 
activity rates. In chapter 5 two specific activity-rate variants are 
distinguished, which combine with the two demographic projections to 
produce four labour-force projections. In chapter 6 these projections 
are discussed and compared with those made in 1986. 
In chapter 7 a description of the input-elements regarding the 
regional part of the model will be given. Chapter 8 presents the 
results of the regional population projections, while in chapter 9 
attention will be focused on the results of the regional labour-force 
projections. 
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2. THE RELEVANCE OF POPULATION PROJECTIONS AND THE USE OF PROJECTION 
MODELS 
That the alterations in size and composition of a country's or 
region's population depend on the three factors mortality, fertility 
(or number of births) and international/interregional migration, may 
be taken for granted. 
While each individual factor has its own influence on the 
development of population figures, in most West-European countries 
their interaction has caused population growth to slacken in the last 
decade, and may even turn it negative eventually. Besides, the aging 
tendency of the population is changing its the demographic 
composition. As a consequence, public authorities find themselves 
confronted with some difficult problems, which need to be solved by 
policy measures. 
Perhaps the most serious implication of the demographic changes 
observed is that the labour force, too, is changing in size and 
composition. An increased share of older working people has no doubt 
consequences for productivity and for the influx into the labour 
market. In view of the economic goal of full employment (or at least 
the lowest possible unemployment rates), a change in job requirements 
is the obvious result. 
The second implication is that the need for services is shifting 
in many ways, ranging from an increasing demand for health care to a 
declining demand for youth education. 
The consequences for physical planning are the third aspect 
worth notice. Changing demands on the housing market are but one 
example. 
Obviously, to design policy measures that can solve the 
problems, a clear insight into the development of the population is 
indispensable. Efforts to estimate future population figures have 
therefore been carried on for many years, mostly with the help of 
projection models as a more or less scientific instrument. A full 
description of the various models used would exceed the aim of this 
study; in the DEMETER 1986 study short descriptions of the so-called 
Malthus, Lotka and Leslie model can be found. 
The present study builds on to the 1986 DEMETER model. The 
present projection model is practically the same as the one used in 
1986, except that international migration, which had been totally left 
out in 1986, this time had to be considered as far as Germany and 
Ireland are concerned. 
Figure 2.1 presents a diagram of the model; a full description 
can be found in the 'DEMETER 1986' report. A remark is in order 
concerning the basic variable in figure 2.1, 'initial population at 
time t'. By the initial population is understood in all cases the 
female and male population on the first of January in 1985, broken 
down by five-year age brackets. These basic data have been provided by 
the Eurostat Directorate of Demographic and Social Statistics. For 
Spain, the figures relate to the national totals minus the region 
'Ceuta y Melilla'. 
Although not directly relevant to the national part of this 
study, two remarks concerning the regional population are in order. 
For Greece, no regional figures were available about the year 1985. 
Since the regional figures must add up to the national total, the 
Greek regional population in 1985 has been estimated from the detailed 
regional figures of 1984 and the overall regional totals and detailed 
national figures of 1985. 
The data for the Dutch regions were incomplete in that no 
correction had been made for the recently added 'twelfth' province of 
the Netherlands, the reclaimed areas called 'Flevoland'. With the help 
of figures provided by the 'Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics' 
(CBS), the regional part could be successfully completed. 
The regional division is the one prevailing in 1989. No account 
has been taken of the revision of NUTS published in november 1989. 
Figure 2.1. Pro jec t ion Method - Nat ional level 
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3. THE INPUT ELEMENTS FOR THE NATIONAL PROJECTION MODEL 
3.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter some attention has already been paid to 
the primary input element of the model, namely, the population in the 
base year. Figure 2.1 shows that mortality and fertility are the 
principal influences on the future course of the size and structure of 
the population. Before dealing with these two factors, let us devote a 
few words on another input element, namely international migration. 
3.2. International migration 
3.2.1. General remarks 
Next to the factors of natural growth, fertility and mortality, 
international migration influences the growth of the population. 
Indeed, because migrants mostly are not an average reflection of 
society, population structure is even more sensitive to migration than 
to the other factors. In DEMETER 1986 the assumption was made 'that in 
line with observable developments net international migration in the 
EC will be as close to zero as to be negligible'. The same assumption 
will be adhered to here, with the exception of Germany and Ireland, as 
will be explained below. 
International migration, already in 1980 a factor of minor 
importance, had become even less significant by 1985. That is at any 
rate the conclusion that can be drawn from figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1. Net migration per 1000 average population; 1985 versus 
1980 
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The histogram indicates a clear decrease in the relative volume 
of migration in the majority of EC­12 countries. Slight deviations are 
exhibited by Italy, Denmark and the United Kingdom, Ireland being the 
only state diverging considerably from the average. 
Apart from the overall diminishing significance of migration, 
wide fluctuations can be observed in some countries (see figure 3.2). 
Sometimes these fluctuations stretch over relatively long periods (for 
instance in Ireland), but sometimes the pattern seems almost 
random (for instance in Spain). These fluctuations make acceptable 
projections of migration very hard to draw up. The most that can be 
said is that much depends on the economic and social conditions both 
in the country of origin and in that of destination. 
Figure 3.2. Development of net migration per 1000 average population 
(1970­1986) 
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There is yet another argument for leaving international 
migration out of account. Actually, national migration figures are not 
difficult to obtain, though the breakdown by age and sex is not 
without problems for some countries. But the real problems will 
manifest themselves at the second stage of the study when regional 
figures come into the picture as origin and destination of migrants at 
the regional level generally is not recorded. Admittedly, this 
argument is not a decisive one, but merely complementary to the 
previous two. 
3.2.2. Immig rants _f rc;[?_Eastern Europe settling in Germany 
Two exceptions had to be made to the decision to ignore 
international migration. The first refers to Germany. The political 
upheaval in East-European countries induced a growing number of their 
inhabitants to emigrate to Germany. The tendency reached a provisional 
climax in 1989 but, as figure 3.3 indicates, had started as far back 
as 1986. The relevant figures include the numbers of so-called 
'Uebersiedler' (emigrants from the German Democratic Republic) as well 
as 'Aussiedler' (emigrants from the remaining East-European 
countries) . 
Figure 3.3. Immigration from Eastern Europe into Germany (1980-1989) 









The inflow has shown explosive growth (for the most part due to 
the 'Uebersiedler'), but its future course is hard to predict. No 
doubt, the economic and political developments in the country of 
origin dictate to a high degree the movements of those who are 
planning to leave their native country as well as those who are 
planning to return!. On the other hand, the conditions in the country 
destination are of great importance as well. Already there are 
10 ­
signs (in some regions more than in others) of increasing tension on 
the labour and housing markets, in spite of prosperous economic 
conditions. 
Because a true estimate of future emigration to Germany is 
impossible to make, the decision has been made to leave German 
immigration in the period 1990­2015 out of the picture and consider 
only that in the first five­year period (1985­1989). 
The size and composition (age, sex and region of destination) of 
the migration flows have been estimated from figures provided by the 
'Bundesausgleichsamt'. From that institution the following data were 
obtained: 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 
number x 
age specification χ 
sex specification χ 
region of destination χ 
















χ = available 
­ = not available 
A few remarks are due. 
­ All figures available for 1989 are exclusive of the month of 
December, so we had to make our own estimate for that month. 
­ The Bundesausgleichsarat's age classification differed on some points 
from ours. With the help of the migration schedule used in 'DEMETER 
1986' the original figures have been re­allocated. 
The immigrants of 1989 were distributed among the age brackets by 
the ratio observed during the 1985­1988 period. 
­ The region of destination was specified only on the so­called 
'Länder'­level (which is equal to the Eurostat NUTS­I 
classification). Within each NUTS­I region the number of immigrants 
was divided among the related NUTS­II region in proportion to their 
population shares. 
­ The distinction between Uebersiedler and Aussiedler is of great 
significance because of their different location patterns. The 
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additional information thus obtained proved very useful for the 
estimates concerned with the regions of destination of the 1989 
immigrants. 
3.2.3. The migration pattern of_Ireland 
Ireland, like Germany, shows a distinctive migration pattern. 
For a number of years Ireland has been characterised by a considerable 
outflow of people. For that reason, the non-migration option has not 
been applied to Ireland. For the 1985-1990 period, a correction has 
been made from figures provided by the Central Statistics Office of 
Ireland; average net migration in those years amounted to 
approximately - 30,000 persons. 
For the projection regarding the 1990-2015 period the non-
migration option was re-introduced. For the same reasons as mentioned 
with respect to Germany, a justifiable estimate of the size and 
composition of future migration flows is practically impossible. Table 
3.1 shows that, while a negative net migration persisted through all 
five years between 1985 and 1990, the fluctuations were nonetheless 
considerable. 
Table 3.1. Irish net migration (up to mid-April of each year) 
absolute number per 1000 population 
1985 - 20,000 5.7 
1986 - 28,400 8.0 
1987 - 27,000 7.6 
1988 - 32,000 9.0 
1989 - 46,000 13.0 
Source: Central Statistics Office of Ireland 
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3.3. Mortality 
Mortality has long been the most stable demographic indicator in 
Western Europe. A marginal decline in age-specific death rates 
combined with a steadily aging population makes for a very constant 
overall death rate in all but a few EC-12 countries. Table 3.2 
displays that stability for the period 1960-1985. 
Table 3.2. Death rates (per 1000 population), period 1960-1985 













EC12 10.5 10.6 10.6 10.6 10.3 10.2 
Although each country has its own specific development, from 
table 3.1 the overall death rate of the EC-12 as a whole seems to have 
regained an equilibrium after a minor disruption of the stable pattern 
between 1975 and 1980. 
We have already pointed out that on the whole age-specific death 
rates show but a minimum of slackening. Figure 3.4 illustrates that 
fact. The Danish age-specific death rates between 1960 and 1985 show a 
slow decline and in some periods even a slight increase. We feel 
justified, therefore, to assume for both population variants that the 
mortality pattern prevailing in 1985 will continue in the decades to 
come. 
From a comparison with DEMETER 1986, the present age-specific 
mortality rates appear to deviate only marginally from the 1986 ones. 
Only the higher age brackets (60-64, over 65) display a distinctive 
decline of the mortality rate in the majority of states. 
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3.4. Evolution of fertility 
In contrast with mortality, fertility as a demographic factor 
has changed appreciably in recent decades. Because economic, cultural, 
institutional and psychological factors tend to influence fertility, 
the extent of the change varies among countries. For that reason, the 
fertility aspect deserves some attention. 
3.4.1. Overall fertility 
In general, fertility appears to have declined in Western Europe 
since 1960. Figure 3.5 gives an impression of the declining trend by 
illustrating the development of total period fertility in each member 
state of the EC-12 through the 1960-1985 period. This fertility rate 
can be defined as the average number of living children a woman would 
produce if during her complete fertile life cycle the age-specific 
fertility rates observed in a certain year were maintained. 
The figure reveals some striking similarities among nations in 
the evolution of fertility. In all countries but the Netherlands 
fertility can be observed to have risen in the first five-year period. 
1965 seems to mark the beginning of an opposite tendency. Since then, 
the fertility rates have dropped in all countries with the exception 
of Greece. In 1985 fertility was lowest in Germany, but the 
divergences among the countries are small. Only Ireland stands out. 
The countries fell naturally apart into two categories, with to 
one side the four South-European nations and Ireland, which have all 
exhibited steadily decreasing fertility rates up till now, and to the 
other the seven remaining nations, where fertility ceased to decline 
in 1975, since when it has been relatively constant. 
16 
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3.4.2. Age-specific fertility 
The overall fertility rate shows similar development patterns in 
the various countries, but the question remains whether the same is 
true of its constituent elements. Some more information can be 
gathered from age-specific fertility rates, reflecting the number of 
live births per 1000 women of a particular age bracket. In the 
relevant diagrams, all values on the Y-axis relating to fertility 
refer to that ratio (absolute number of births per 1000 women). 
For a better understanding of age-specific fertility, figure 3.6 
presents, for all EC-countries, so-called fertility pyramids for a 
number of years. Some clear conclusions can be drawn. 
- Perhaps the most important conclusion is that in all countries, all 
age brackets seems to have contributed to the declining overall 
fertility in comparison with 1960. 
- In almost all countries, the 25-29 age bracket is comparatively the 
most fertile. Up to the 1970-1975 period its leading position had 
been much less pronounced. 
- The segmentation used for country groups in sub-section 3.3.1 
appears to applicable here as well. The continued decrease of 
fertility in the South-European countries and Ireland versus the 
stagnation in the seven remaining nations from 1975 onward is one 
striking tendency. Another is the dramatic drop in the fertility of 
the 20-24 age bracket in the North-European countries (except the 
Netherlands). In Southern Europe and Ireland, fertility dropped 
dramatically in the age bracket between 25 and 29. In Greece, the 
fertility of women between the ages of 20 and 25 in 1985 exceeded 
the level of 1960! 
18 
Figure 3.6. Fertilitypyramids by country (1960-1985) 
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The fertility pyramids have given only a first glimpse of the 
age­specific aspects of fertility, and a more detailed examination 
is required. To that end, figure 3.7 illustrates the development of 
the fertility rates of the five most important age brackets, 
calculated on a five­year average base to get rid of possible short­
term fluctuations. Of course, the fact has to be taken into account 
that the scale values vary for the different age brackets. Given the 
somewhat different trends observed above between, on the one hand, 
northern Member States and, on the other hand, southern Member States 
plus Ireland, figure 3.7 sets out the trends, separately, for each of 
these two groups. 
Figure 3.7. Fertility­rates by age bracket 
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In the North-European countries, the fertility rates in the 15-
19 age bracket show a moderate drop from the 1965-70 period onwards, 
ending in an extremely low value for the Netherlands in 1985. We have 
assumed that this value touches the bottom as far as the Netherlands 
are concerned. Even more remarkable is the stagnating fertility rate, 
albeit on a relatively high level, of this age bracket in the United 
Kingdom. Unlike Northern Europe, the Southern European nations and 
Ireland are marked by increasing fertility rates right up the end of 
the 1970s. Italy is exceptional in that there the decrease already 
started around 1975. Fertility in this age bracket is still 
comparatively high in Greece and Portugal. 
The age bracket between 20 and 24 displays to some degree the 
same tendency. Again, in the North-European countries the fertility 
rates have been dropping since about 1965. Note that because of the 
diverging scale values, the fall is much steeper than with the younger 
age bracket. Another difference is that the process does not seem to 
have come to an end. With the exception of Italy and this time also 
Ireland, the trend in the remaining nations shows a lag of about 10 
years. Once more the fertility rate is relatively high in Greece and 
Portugal, and low in the Netherlands. 
The group between the ages of 25 and 29 differs on several 
points from the previous one. First of all, in the North-European 
countries fertility dropped less, stabilisation setting in around 
1975. For some countries a slight increase can even be observed. 
Secondly, in the South-European states the rates began to drop already 
in the 1960s. Finally, not Portugal and Greece, but Ireland and (to a 
lesser extent) France are marked by high rates. 
The age brackets between 30 and 34 and between 35 and 39 are 
very much alike, and comparable on some points with the previous age 
bracket (but keep the different scale values along the Y-axis in 
mind). Perhaps the most striking feature is the exceptional position 
of Ireland. 
Evidently, then, every age bracket develops along its own 
specific path. Furthermore, the results seem to justify the division 
of the EC member states into two groups. 
- 24 
3.4.3. Fertility in the two population variants 
As stated at the beginning of this section, fertility is 
influenced by a range of variables. Some are relatively easy to 
identify, for example, the increased participation of women in the 
labour market, which undoubtedly has induced the tendency for women to 
postpone childbearing, already pointed out in the previous sub-
section. But not all influences are of an economic nature. Indeed, the 
changed attitude to religion also has a bearing on fertility, but this 
is much harder to define. There are so many factors that affect 
fertility one way or the other as to make the projection of fertility 
patterns a hazardous exercise. Nevertheless, for the very reason that 
fertility varies over time to a much greater extent than mortality, 
population projections based on non-constant fertility would seem to 
be necessary. 
In view however of the uncertainties involved the option chosen 
was to draw up two demographic projections, based, respectively, on 
the assumption of 'stable' and 'non-stable' fertility. The assumption 
of 'stable fertility' means that age-specific fertility rates of 
1985 are held constant into the future. When examing the evidence 
of the past as in DEMETER 1986, the fertility rates for the 15-19 and 
20-24 age brackets are seen to be on a considerably lower level for 
nearly all EC-12 member states. The same is true of the fertility 
rates of the other age brackets in the four South-European countries 
and Ireland, but the other countries display input values partly equal 
and partly even superior to the level of DEMETER 1986, especially in 
the 30-34 bracket. 
In recognition of such variation over time the second variant, 
as in DEMETER 1986, features non-stable fertility rates, although 
unlike DEMETER 1986 the projections were not developed from the 
overall fertility rate. Indeed, the previous sub-sections have 
revealed that individual age brackets tend to show very similar 
development patterns in all countries. For example, in the 1980s the 
1) For Spain 1984. 
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20-24 age bracket showed a steep drop in fertility, the lowest point 
of which does not seem to have been reached yet. Another general trend 
is the inertia some countries exhibit, in particular Portugal, Greece, 
Spain and Ireland. Their fertility rates seem to lag some ten years 
behind those of the North-European nations. Italy, too, seems to 
suffer from inertia, if not to the same extent. 
Based on observed trends the age-specific fertility rates have 
been extrapolated until 2015. In contrast to the procedure followed in 
"Demeter 1986", where first overall fertility was projected and later 
on a subdivision was created between the age-brackets, this time 
starting point have been age-specific fertility rates. Afterwards then 
overall fertility, the resultant of the sum of the subgroups, can be 
calculated and a consistency check can be made, in some cases leading 
to slight alterations in the initial values. 
The method applied to the projection of the age-specific 
fertility rates consists of a "curve-fitting" procedure. The course of 
the observed values in the period from the beginning of the sixties up 
to 1985 is caught in a mathematical expression by a trial and error 
process. 
The weight of the observations increases with time, so that most 
recent developments carry the heaviest influence. In this way account 
is taken of developments over a long time period, without a simple 
extrapolation of observations, which would lead in a number of cases 
to rather exaggerated results. 
By introducing the tiraevariable for the period 1990-1995 into 
the calculated matheraathical expression, values are found for the 
first projection periods. For later periods application of this method 
seems rather hazardous, so a choice was made for a drastic smoothing 
down of the curves, leading to practical stability after the year 
2000. 
Although this method is very refined, compared to simple 
extrapolations one should bear in mind that the factors influencing 
fertility, as mentioned before, are various and projections will 
always be surrounded by great uncertainties. Nevertheless observed 
trends seem lucid enough to offer adequate support for a projection on 
the short to medium run. Moreover as trends for the individual age 
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specific projections have a tendency of counteracting, the resulting 
picture of overall fertility will show a strongly reduced error 
margin. 
For the individual age brackets the projected values are 
illustrated in Annex 3.1. Up to 1985 the graphs reproduce the observed 
five-year averages; for subsequent years, the values for the six 
projection years have been filled in. Because the rates for the 40-44 
and 45-49 age brackets showed but marginal changes, these categories 
have been omitted. Annex 3.2 contains the same projections, but this 
time grouped by age bracket rather than by country. 
Naturally it is interesting to establish the consequences of 
these projections for the development of total fertility. Table 3.3 
gives an impression of the evolution of the total fertility rate among 
women between the ages of 15 and 49. The last column gives in brackets 
the total fertility rate which emerges when the 1985 age-specific 
fertility rates are assumed constant. 
Table 3.3. Development of the total fertility (15-49) 
(live births per 1000 women aged 15-49) 













EC 12 46.2 43.8 40.6 (43.4) 
From the above table, several conclusions can be drawn. In the 
entire EC, total fertility is clearly on the wane. Especially the 
Irish decline is considerable; nevertheless Ireland will still boast 
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by far the highest fertility within the EC in 2015. Apart from 
Ireland, the drop of fertility in Portugal is relatively speaking very 
large. 
Whether constant fertility rates are assumed or age-specific 
rates projected, seems to make little difference to the development of 
total fertility in the countries of North-West Europe. For the four 
southern states and Ireland matters are quite different, however. For 
these countries, projected age-specific fertility rates make for a 
distinct decrease in total fertility. 
The conclusion from the above arguments, surprising at first 
sight, is that in the year 2015, total fertility will be clearly 
higher in the United Kingdom and France than in the South-European 
countries. Two explanatory factors can be offered: 
- The age brackets with the greatest relative impact on total 
fertility (20-24, 25-29, and 30-34) have for some time displayed a 
stable pattern in France and the United Kingdom, but were distinctly 
on the wane in the southern states up to 1985. Such tendencies 
naturally reflect themselves in the projection of the fertility 
rates for the individual countries. 
- Besides the projected age-specific fertility rates, the age 
composition of the female population in the categories between the 
ages of 15 and 49 naturally affects total fertility. From table 3.4, 
the age brackets marked by relatively high fertility rates appear to 
take up the largest female population shares in the United Kingdom 
and France in 2015, which also results in a relatively high total 
fertility. 
Table 3.4. Women in the age brackes with relative high fertility (20-
34 years of age), as a percentage of the female population 
between the ages of 15 and 49 in 2015 
France 41.9 






4. RESULTS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS 
4.1. Introduction 
Two variants of the demographic projection have been developed. 
One of them is based entirely on the figures recorded in 1985, all 
variables being assumed to keep the 1985 level right up to 2015. In 
the second projection, of the three variables theoretically 
manipulable, only fertility will be subjected to change. That makes 
for some specific differences between the two projections. 
The level of fertility prevailing in a period affects only the 
youngest age bracket (from 0 to 4, at a five-year interval). That is 
to say, a change in fertility by 1990 will five years hence affect 
only the 0-4 age bracket (and through it, of course, total 
population). In 2000, the 0-4 and 5-9 age brackets will deviate from 
the former projection, and so on. So, in absolute numbers, the 
projections for the older population brackets will be the same in both 
variants, but the relative shares in total population will change for 
all age brackets in all projection years as a result of the changing 
age structure of the population. 
This chapter presents the final results of both variants, 
comparing them with the ones obtained in 1986 and with estimates made 
by national statistical services. The first part of this chapter 
highlights changes in the size of the population; the second part pays 
attention to modifications in its structure. 
4.2. Long-term developments 
4.2.1 Increase or decrease? 
For a long time countries in Western Europe were marked by the 
persistent growth of their populations. But, as pointed out already in 
DEMETER 1986, in most countries the growth rate steadily decreased in 
the 1960s and 1970s. Actually, several countries are approaching the 
29 -
point where, in view of the low fertility and almost constant 
mortality, the population will begin to decline. In the long run, most 
EC-countries are bound to reach and pass that point. 
Figure 4.1 indicates that when that point is reached by either 
projection method. It shows very clearly that for some countries the 
process of decline has already set in (Denmark, Belgium, Luxemburg), 
while the population in others appears to go on growing significantly 
until at least the year 2000 (France, Netherlands, Spain). The 
population of the EC as a whole is expected to increase up to the 
1995-2000 period, after which a decrease sets in which is projected to 
take it back, in the 2005-2010 period, to the level of 1985. 
Figure 4.1. Index figures of the development of population in the EC-
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Comparison of the three projections reveals a few striking 
trends. 
First, for most EC-12 member states the new population forecasts 
show a smaller increase or greater decrease than DEMETER 1986. The 
difference can be explained mainly by the assumption made in 1986 that 
fertility would remain on the level then prevailing. As was 
demonstrated in figure 3.5 and table 3.3, overall fertility has not 
developed according to that assumption, but dropped moderately in most 
North-European countries and a great deal in the South-European states 
and Ireland. At the least, the drop was enough to compensate the 
decline in mortality. The only exceptions are Germany and Luxemburg. 
The diverging trend in Germany is due simply to the correction for the 
influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe. The slight deviation 
observed for Luxemburg is mostly due to the underestimation of the 
1985 population in DEMETER 1986. 
Secondly, the projections made by national statistical services 
(source: Eurostat; Demographic Statistics) show in most cases a 
(slight) upward deviation from the ones obtained with the DEMETER-
model. For some countries the difference can be attributed directly to 
the fact that national projections are based on rather obsolescent 
data; in other cases, national projections include a positive 
immigration rate. On the whole, the deviations are not excessive, 
except for Luxemburg and Ireland. Unlike the projection drawn up by 
the Irish Statistical Office, both DEMETER variants result in a 
distinct growth of the Irish population owing mostly to the non-
migration option adopted for the 1990-2015 period. However, the latest 
projections indicate far less growth than assumed in DEMETER 1986, due 
to the once-only migration correction for the 1985-1990 period and the 
considerable reduction of fertility. 
Lastly, a remark is in order about the difference between the 
two variants of the present projection. The stable-fertility variant 
produces for most countries higher population figures than the variant 
based on projected fertility. The conclusion is obvious: projection of 
age-specific fertility rates results in a declining overall fertility 
in most countries, the exceptions being Denmark, the Netherlands and 
the United Kingdom. 
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Table 4.1 recapitulates the variant based on projected 
fertility. It gives a review of the absolute population volume by 
country and sex for three projection years. 
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Another method to represent the future development of the 
population volume is by displaying the yearly growth rates within 
five-year periods. Figure 4.2 is a graphic representation of these 
rates for the individual countries. Of course this presentation leads 
to the same conclusions, but it also provides further information. 
With the exception of Ireland, in all countries the growth rates 
continue to drop as time goes on. For each variant and every country 
the histograms clearly indicate at which point in time the situation 
of positive growth passes into one of negative 'growth'. For Greece, 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland the three variants are strikingly 
different. The drop in age-specific fertility rates during the period 
1980-1985 accounts for the difference between DEMETER 1986 and the new 
projections, and their continued decline in the projected-fert ility 
variant causes this variant to end up lowest. 
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The variant based on projected fertility is represented in the 
table by average yearly growth rates, broken down by period and sex. 
Apparently, in the 2000-2015 periods all EC-12 countries except 
Ireland will be confronted with a declining population! From the 
breakdown by sex, the growth-rate development is more or less similar 
for men and women. 
Figure 4.2. Yearly growth rates for five-year periods of population in 
the E.C.-12 countries 
E.C.-12 
growth rat· (%) 
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Figure 4 . 2 . continued 
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4.2.2 Relative position of countries 
Needless to say that differences in growth rates have 
consequences not only for the countries themselves, but also for their 
relative positions within the EC. Excessive modifications are not 
expected, but some minor changes are bound to occur. DEMETER 1986 
already pointed out that West Germany would lose its leading position 
to France in the future. However, the assumption underlying the German 
projection must be kept in mind, namely, that the inflow of immigrants 
from Eastern Europe will be negligible for the period from 1990 to 
2010. Table 4.3 provides the relevant percentages. 
Table 4.3. Percentage share of the total population of EC-12 
% 1985 % 2015 
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4.3. Changes in the composition of the population 
4.3.1. The population shift 
As already stated, the population tends to change not only in 
size but also in composition. Annex 4.1 illustrates for both sexes the 
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shares of the three major age brackets in the total population in 1985 
and 2015. 
The most striking general trend is, as could be expected, the 
decreasing share of young people (between the ages of 0 and 14) as a 
result of declining fertility. Equally familiar is the considerable 
difference between the shares of men and women over the age of 60 in 
total population. Annex 3.1 confirmed it for Denmark, but in fact in 
all EC-12 countries female age brackets show a lower mortality rate 
than their male counterparts. 
But apart from such general conclusions some specific effects 
deserve notice. In contrast to all other EC-members, for Ireland only 
a minor increase in the share of the over-sixty is projected for the 
1985-2015 period. Moreover, the decline of the 0-14 age bracket is 
fully compensated by a relative growth of the group between the ages 
of 15 and 59. The same tendency, albeit less pronounced, can be 
observed for the United Kingdom. In Germany, despite the influx of 
relatively young immigrants from Eastern Europe, in 2015 females of 60 
and older will account for nearly one third of the total female 
population! The corresponding share of senior males, though amounting 
to no more than a quarter, is still the highest percentage of the 
whole EC. 
A more detailed illustration is given by the so-called 
'population pyramids' (Annex 4.2). In fact the term is long outdated, 
at least with respect to EC-12 countries. In 1985 the pyramid form was 
clearly outlined only for Ireland. For the other countries the 
combined effects of mortality and fertility had led to a shape more 
like an onion. In view of the course of fertility, that tendency will 
become stronger in the future. 
If the Irish pyramid could be said to have the most 'primitive' 
shape, in 2015 the most futuristic shape is doubtlessly the one 
representing the German population. Indeed, it is beginning to 
resemble an inverse pyramid. The share of the over-seventy is 
43 
extremely large - especially the female part - as compared to the 
other countries (notice the diverging scale values along the X-axis!). 
In 2015 France and the United Kingdom will be the countries with 
the most evenly divided population, all age brackets except that of 
seniors over the age of 70 being roughly of equal sizes. 
4.3.2. Demographic pressure 
The previous sub-section broadly discussed and illustrated the 
structural changes of the population. Of course, such changes have 
economic implications. Therefore, an alternative approach to the 
demographic evolution is to explore the so-called demographic 
pressure, that is, to establish what proportion of the total 
population is considered economically non-productive and dependent on 
the active population. As already observed, for nearly all EC-
countries the share of youth is expected to drop and that of the 
senior population over 60 years of age to increase. How that will work 
out in terms of total demographic pressure is illustrated by figure 
4.3 in which the agegroups below 15 and over 60 and the combination of 
the two are shown as a percentage of the group 15-59 (representing 
active population). 
Figure 4.3. Demographic pressure and the constituting elements 
(projected fertility, 1985 vs. 2015) 
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Figure 4 .3 . continued 
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Some obvious conclusions can be drawn from Figure 4.3. 
- In all EC-12 countries, the demographic pressure caused by the 0-14 
age bracket shows a marked decline. The greatest drop is recorded in 
Ireland, but that country still maintains a high relative level. 
- On the other hand, increased pressure from the group over sixty 
years old is plainly noticeable everywhere except in Ireland. 
- In most EC-12 countries, total demographic pressure seems to be on 
the wane. Germany and Luxemburg in particular display a sharp 
increase, largely due to extreme demographic pressure from the group 
over the age of 60. 
- By contrast, Ireland shows a considerable decrease of total 
demographic pressure. In Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom a 
moderate decline is recorded. 
One last remark is due about the shifts in the constituting 
elements of demographic pressure. Although on the whole (except in 
Germany, Luxemburg and Ireland) demographic pressure does not seem to 
change a great deal, the same is not true of the two individual age 
brackets. The often considerable drop in the relative share of young 
people has been set off by an even greater increase in the share of 
the older people. Mark, however, that senior citizens tend to cost 
more to society than young people, mainly because they need more 
medical care and social support. 
Exact percentages of demographic pressure and the difference 
between 1985 and 2015 are given in a table in annex 4.3. 
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5. THE INPUT ELEMENTS FOR THE NATIONAL LABOUR-FORCE PROJECTIONS 
5.1. Introduction 
From an economic point of view the most important aspect of 
demographic projections is how they work out on the labour force. This 
chapter introduces the concept of activity rates and discusses their 
past development and assumed future course. 
5.2. Activity rates 
5.2.1. Conceptual definition 
Activity rates are defined as the proportion of the total 
population either employed or actively in search of jobs (generally 
referred to as the economically active population). They can be broken 
down by age and sex. The definition of activity rates gives rise to 
many statistical problems. For instance, is an adolescent student who 
works after school hours or in the weekend economically active or not? 
Is a person registered as unemployed indeed actively looking for work, 
or is his registration only a pretext for claiming a social-security 
grant? How does the effectiveness of labour-exchange offices affect 
the willingness of unemployed to be registered? The answers to these 
and many other questions may affect the number of economically active 
persons counted and thus the activity rates. 
The introduction of regular labour-force sample surveys in the 
EC has solved at least the problems that relate to registration, 
households being asked to reply to questions like: "Were you working 
or actively looking for a job in such and such a period ?", regardless 
of official registration. 
Up to 1981, two concepts of activity were used in the LFSSs. 
The more restricted concept relates to persons with a main occupation 
and to those who are out of work but looking for a job; the more 
extended one includes in addition those with an occasional occupation 
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and those not having worked before but willing to do so. In the 
labour-force sample surveys conducted since 1983, the ILO-concept has 
been used, which is very close to the former extended concept. For our 
purpose this concept seems the most appropriate. In this concept, 
employment figures are expressed in numbers of people actually 
working, full-time or part-time, in a main or occasional job, while to 
the group of unemployed are counted the people willing but unable to 
work. 
5.2.2. The analysis of past trends in activity rates 
The most striking differences in activity rates among countries 
are on the one hand those between male and female rates and on the 
other those between the rates for the groups between the ages of 15 
and 19 and those for the people of 60 and over. Such age-specific 
activity rates and their development are affected by many different 
factors. The legal rules about school participation, which vary widely 
from one country to another, make for different work participation by 
the younger groups, as table 5.1 shows. In Belgium and the Netherlands 
educational enrolment is much higher than in the other EC countries. 
A group that shows a remarkable decline is that of males of over 
55, due mostly to the advancement of the age of compulsory retirement 
and the creation of opportunities to stop working earlier without 
serious financial consequences. As an illustration, table 5.2 gives 
the activity rates for males in the 60-64 age bracket for the years 
1979 and 1987. 
50 
Table 5.1. Activity rates, males and females, 15-19 age bracket 



































































a) 1979: extended LFSS concept; 1987: ILO-concept 
b) 1985 
c) 1981 
*) not available 
Source: Labour Force Sample Survey 
a) Table 5.2. Activity rates, males, 60-64 age bracket 






































a) 1979: extended LFSS concept; 1987: ILO-concept 
b) 1985 
c) 1981 
*) not available 
Source: Labour Force Sample Survey 
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The activity rate of males between 25 and 55 is very high in all 
countries (between 95 and 99 per cent) and shows a stable pattern, 
though lately there has been a slight tendency to decline. 
For females the situation is quite different. Not only is their 
overall participation in all countries much lower than for males, 
there are also some more unexpected differences. In the South-European 
countries (except Portugal), the Benelux countries and Ireland, 
overall female participation is structurally lower than in the other 
countries; we shall not go into the causes here. Emancipation and the 
shift of employment from industrial to service sectors will produce a 
greater proportion of "female jobs" and thus a higher activity rate of 
women; growth may well be most rapid in the countries where female 
participation is now lowest. 
5.3. The projection of the activity rates 
Regarding the course of age- and sex-specific activity rates in 
the future, two variants have been developed. The first is based on 
stable rates, that is to say, all age- and sex-specific activity rates 
are assumed to maintain the level they had in 1985. The second variant 
assumes non-stable activity rates. Considerations regarding 
educational enrolment, earlier retirement, saturation levels in the 
long terra, and trends observed in the period covered by the LFSSs, 
determine the projected course of these rates up to 2015. 
Because the activity rates have been projected on the same 
assumptions as in DEMETER 1986, the emerging trends are broadly 
similar too. As in 1986, the activity rates corresponding to the 
higher age brackets of both sexes (over 60) show a clear decline. 
The results of the Labour-Force Sample Survey indicate that 
female participation has risen less rapidly than was expected in 1986. 
Accordingly, the projected rate of increase of female participation is 
levelled off in comparison with DEMETER 1986. 
The male activity rates show the reverse tendency. In the 
projection for DEMETER 1986, the participation of men between the ages 
of 20 and 50 remained on a virtually unchanging high level. However, 
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in most countries a decline - albeit slight - appears to have set in 
within the individual age brackets, a fact that is reflected in the 
outcomes of the present projection. 
The graphs of annex 5.1 illustrate for all countries and age 
brackets the past course of activity rates (based on the Labour Force 
Sample Survey, LFSS) and their projections. A few marginal notes must 
be made: 
- Only the projection years till 2000 are embodied in the graphs. The 
projections for later years show such minor alterations that they 
have been left out for easier interpretation. 
- The Y-axis scale values vary among age brackets. Within each bracket 
the same scale values have been adhered to as far as possible. 
- Because of a modified definition, the 1987 figures for the 
Netherlands have not been included in the graphs. So, as for the 
other countries, the projection for the Netherlands is based on the 
ILO definition. 
- Concerning Portugal and Spain, only for 1986 and 1987 are LFSS 
figures known. We have combined them with the 1980 data used in 
DEMETER 1986 to work out an estimate for the base year 1985. 
- For Greece, no values for 1979 are available, while for Belgium. 
Luxemburg and Ireland no figures are known for 1981. 
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6. RESULTS OF THE LABOUR-FORCE PROJECTIONS 
6.1. Introduction 
The calculation of future labour-force developments is a 
straightforward exercise, consisting in multiplying the activity rates 
by the projected population for each age group and either sex. 
Admittedly, the multiplication of two projected variables which are 
none too reliable in themselves, makes for considerable uncertainty, 
especially in the long term. Nevertheless, we believe the emerging 
trends will hold, albeit with a certain margin. 
In the previous chapter, two variants have been developed with 
respect to activity rates. The combination with the two population 
projections produces four labour-force projections. A single remark is 
due before further attention is given to the ultimate results. Section 
4.1 pointed out that the two population forecasts deviate from each 
other in a specific way. Because the level of fertility affects only 
the youngest age group, the two projections for the older age brackets 
of the population will not differ. In practice this means that two 
labour-force projections founded on the same activity rates in the 
final projection year 2015 will differ only in the first two labour-
force age brackets (that is, the 15-19 and 20-24 age brackets). For 
that reason and to keep the overall picture transparent, only two 
variants of the labour-force projections will be chosen for further 
consideration in this chapter, namely, the labour-force projection 
based on stable activity rates and projected fertility, and the one 
based on projected activity rates and projected fertility. 
6.2. Development of overall activity rates 
The development of the overall activity rate (total and split up 
by sex) is influenced mainly by the course of the age-specific rates. 
However, in some cases the shift in population structure is also of 
- 54 -
great significance. Indeed, even with a smooth time path of age-
specific rates, the overall rate may follow a rather fluctuating 
pattern. 
Tables 6.1 to 6.3 give the total activity rate for the 15-59 age 
group for either sex and for the total. That category has been chosen 
in view of the trend towards earlier retirement and the allied firm 
decrease of activity rates for the 60-64 age bracket. The rates refer 
to the variant based on projected activity rates. 
Table 6.1. Activity rates 15-59, males (projected fertility, projected 
activity-rates) 
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 1985-2015 
Belgium 78.2 76.8 77.3 76.8 75.9 75.6 75.0 -3.2 
Denmark 89.0 88.6 88.5 88.4 88.3 88.2 88.0 -1.0 
France 82.3 81.2 82.3 82.3 81.4 81.4 81.6 -0.7 
Germany 84.4 85.7 86.2 86.4 86.6 86.1 85.7 1.3 
Greece 81.8 79.1 78.7 79.1 79.9 80.9 80.9 -0.9 
Ireland 83.5 81.0 78.8 79.5 80.3 81.9 82.2 -1.2 
Italy 81.5 81.1 82.0 83.2 83.5 83.5 82.8 1.4 
Luxembourg 82.9 83.6 83.8 83.1 82.3 82.0 81.9 -1.0 
Netherlands 78.2 78.3 79.4 78.8 77.9 77.2 76.8 -1.5 
Portugal 86.2 84.7 84.8 85.3 85.5 85.7 85.3 -0.9 
Spain 82.3 80.3 80.7 81.9 82.6 82.8 82.2 -0.1 
United Kingdom 88.8 88.3 88.3 87.5 86.9 86.8 86.6 -2.1 
EC-12 83.6 83.1 83.6 83.8 83.6 83.6 83.3 -0.3 
This projection confirms the outcome of DEMETER 1986 to the 
effect that total male activity for the whole EC will remain stable up 
to 2015 (table 6.1). Unlike Italy and Germany, most other EC-countries 
display a (minor) decrease. With the exception of the Netherlands, the 
same trends could be observed in DEMETER 1986. 
In nearly all countries, total female activity shows a rise 
(table 6.2). Growth is particularly rapid in Spain and Ireland, but 
even in 2015, the rate is still relatively low in both countries. 
Female participation is high in the United Kingdom and extremely high 
in Denmark. All these facts already appeared in DEMETER 1986. A clear 
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difference between the present projections and those made in 1986 
concerns the scope of the changes. Compared to the results of DEMETER 
1986, the progress of female participation is clearly less rapid in 
the present projection. 
Table 6.2. Activity rates 15-59, females (projected fertility, 
projected activity-rates) 

















































































































































EC-12 52.6 55.8 57.1 57.4 57.0 56.6 56.0 3.4 
























































































































EC-12 68.2 69.5 70.5 70.8 70.4 70.3 69.8 1.6 
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The conclusion from the trends outlined above is that total 
activity will increase in the entire EC-12, but not to the extent 
expected in DEMETER 1986 (table 6.3). Indeed, in Belgium and the 
Netherlands the activity rate will even drop in 2015 below the value 
of the base year. Especially the Dutch figures deviate clearly from 
the ones calculated in DEMETER 1986, probably because the increase of 
female participation was overestimated in 1986. 
6.3. Development of the total labour force 
While in the previous section the development of the total 
activity rate was the object of attention, the present section will 
focus on alterations in the labour force, which, as we have seen, 
depend on population growth as well as activity rates. Figure 6.1 
illustrates, for both activity-rate variants, the yearly growth rates 
for the five-year periods of the projection time span. 
Figure 6.1. Yearly growth rates of the labour force, for five-year 
periods (population based on projected fertility) 
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Figure 6 . 1 . continued 
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Figure 6 . 1 . continued 
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Appparently, for most countries the differences in growth rate 
between the two labour-force projections are very slight, as shown in 
table 6.4. 
Table 6.4. Annual growth rate total labour force, stable and projected activity rates (%) 
1990-1995 1995-2000 1990-2000 





















































































EC-12 0.22 0.25 -0.05 -0.05 0.08 0.10 
The conclusion suggests itself that there is no real need to 
make the distinction between stable and projected activity rates. 
However, this conclusion would be too simple. 
For one thing, the two variants do not give exactly the same 
results. For most EC-12 countries, the variant based on projected 
activity rates produces a higher growth rate for the first five-year 
period than the other variant, and a sharper decline towards the end. 
But more important is the considerable difference in composition 
(in terras of age and sex) of the labour force emerging from the two 
variants. 
Another trend appearing from the graphs is the universal 
lowering of the growth rates. Not only is the growth slowing down, but 
in the course of time every country (except Ireland) even gets 
confronted with a contracting labour force. Especially Germany and 
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Luxemburg show a marked relative decrease, which moreover is projected 
to start as early as the 1990-1995 period. 
The same trend emerges from table 6.5, representing the growth 
rates during the 1990-2000 period. For the entire EC-12 the 
expectation is that in the first five years the female labour force 
will grow relatively faster than the male one. In the 1995-2000 period 
on the contrary, the two sexes show hardly any difference, both being 
marked by a slight decrease. 
In absolute terms, the labour force of the Community is expected 
to grow by 1,90 million between 1990 and 1995, and fall by 0,35 
million over the period 1995 to 2000. Between 1990 and 2000, and 
reflecting the activity rate developments noted above, the proportion 
of females in the labour force will have risen from 39,5X to 39,95!. 
The absolute figures are taken up in table 6.6. 
Table 6.5. Labour Force growth 1990-2000 (total period change, X) 
Total Male Female 

























































































































EC-12 1.3 -0.2 1.0 0.7 -0.3 0.4 2.2 -0.2 2.0 
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6.4. The elements of labour-force growth 
The growth of the labour-force is the resultant of three 
elements, namely the size of the population, the shift in the 
population structure, and the projection of the activity rates. Annex 
6.1 illustrates for all EC-12 countries how these elements are 
expected to govern the development of the total labour-force volume in 
the projection periods 1990-1995 and 1995-2000. 
For both projection periods the most striking trends are the 
opposite movements of the male and female labour forces in terms of 
activity rates. In all EC-12 countries the projected development of 
the activity rates has a negative influence on the size of the male 
labour force, but a positive one on the female labour force. 
Some other trends are revealed by the annex. In the entire EC-
12, the evolution of the population over 15, among women as well as 
men, has a positive effect on the evolution of the labour force. The 
same tendency holds broadly for the individual countries, with the 
distinct exception of Germany. 
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In terms of age shift i.e. the effect of a changing weight of 
the different age brackets, the two sexes clearly differ, in the sense 
that in all countries and during both periods (except for Ireland in 
the years between 1995 and 2000), the age shift among men makes a 
greater positive contribution to the development of the total labour 
force than the female age shift. 
So, the general trends visible from the annex conceal a 
considerable difference in the weights of the individual components 
among the countries. The annex shows clearly how narrow is the 
similarity among the countries. For example, while the size of the 
population is the primary factor in France, the age shift has that 
role in Germany. 
In the whole EC-12, the size of the population over 15 seems to 
be the most prominent element. Activity rates appear to make but 
little impact on the growth of the total labour force, except when the 
sexes are considered separately. For males the development of activity 
rates has a strong negative effect, while for females the effect is 
larger than that of the growth of population over 15. 
6.5. The age shifts in the labour force 
An important aspect brought to the surface by the labour-force 
projection broken down by age brackets is the shift expected in the 
structure of the active population. Evidently, this shift will have 
serious implications for the labour market and dictate a change in 
employers' recruiting behaviour. Moreover, an ageing labour force 
gives rise to adjustment problems related to the productivity and 
mobility of labour. Table 6.7 illustrates how the composition of the 
active population will presumably change in the period from 1985 to 
2015. 
63 
Table 6.7. Ageing of the Labour Force 1990-2015 (X in age group) 
































































































EC-12 18.9 14.7 14.3 19.5 20.0 24.9 
In the whole EC-12, over one fifth of the active population was 
still under 25 years old in 1985. According to the projections, the 
proportion will have decreased to below 15 per cent by 2015! That 
decrease will be almost completely compensated by a corresponding 
growth of the share of the over-50 age bracket. The upward shift in 
the population pyramid is the most important cause of these changes. 
On the national level, the shifts are even more drastic for 
Luxemburg, Denmark, and especially Germany. Ireland also deserves 
attention: there, the considerable decline of the relative share held 
by the young active population groups is entirely neutralised by the 
growth, not of the over-50, but of the category between 25 and 49 
years old. 
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7. THE INPUT ELEMENTS FOR THE REGIONAL PROJECTIONS 
7.1. Structure of the regional projection model 
The structure of the regional model (figure 7.1) differs from 
that of the national model only in that migration flows are taken into 
account. That is to say, migration flows among the regions of a 
country, since migration among countries (with the exception of 
Ireland and Germany) is ignored in this study. The following inputs 
are needed for the regional model: 
- population by sex and five-year age bracket on the first of January, 
1985; 
- regional death rates by sex and age bracket; 
- regional fertility rates by relevant age bracket; 
- out-migrants by region of destination, sex, and age bracket. 
These elements will be discussed in section 7.2. The final section 
will deal briefly with the input elements required for regional 
projections of the labour force. Annex 7.1 shows the handled region-
classification 
7.2. The input elements for demographic projections 
7.2.1. Population volume 
Nearly all the statistics relating to the male and female 
population by five-year age brackets on the first of January, 1985 
were available from Eurostat; for the United Kingdom (broken down by 
32 regions) they could be obtained from the national statistical 
service. 
1) After the revision of NUTS (november 1989) some changes have 
occured, Greece for instance is now subdivided in 13 regions. 
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For Greece, detailed figures (by sex and age bracket) on a 
regional level were available only for 1984, so that we had to make 
our own estimate of the Greek regional population in 1985. From the 
detailed regional statistics of 1984, and the overall regional totals 
and detailed national figures of 1985, fairly reliable regional 
figures could be derived for the year 1985. 
The figures for the Netherlands had to be adjusted to 
accommodate its 'twelfth' province ('Flevoland'), constituted in 1986. 
Thanks to detailed data provided by the Netherlands Central Bureau of 
Statistics, the exercise could be carried out accurately. 
A remark is in order regarding the geographical distribution of 
migrants settling in Germany. Although this study has in general 
ignored international migration, an exception has been made for 
Germany and Ireland, for reasons explained in chapter 3. Because the 
destination of the migrants was specified only on the level of so-
called "Länder" (which is equal to the Eurostat NUTS-I-
classification), within each NUTS-I region the total number of 
immigrants was broken down to the regional level of NUTS-II in 
proportion to the population shares. 
7.2.2. Regional death and fertility rates 
Because death and fertility rates tend to come in insufficient 
detail, a method had to be designed to break them down to the desired 
level. 
The application of national rates to the regional population 
produces a theoretical total number of births and deaths in a region 
based on the assumption of equal rates in all regions of a country. 
The actual numbers observed in the same year may be higher or lower 
than the calculated ones. The ratio between observed and calculated 
numbers provides a regional factor representing the deviation from the 
national pattern. On the assumption that region-specific differences 
are reflected proportionally in all regional age-specific rates, sets 
of regional death and fertility rates can be obtained by applying the 
regional factor to the national age-specific death and fertility 
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rates. The above assumption implies that the outcomes of the exercise 
do not account, for instance, for unexpected high mortality in a 
region due to structurally higher death rates among the oldest 
citizens. 
The regional factors have been calculated for 1985 and checked 
against those of 1980 (used in DEMETER 1986) to rule out accidental 
deviations. Only slight differences were found, which points to the 
structural nature of the influences. 
7.2.3. Outmigrants by destination,sex^ and age bracket 
Interregional migration statistics in the detail required (that 
is, by sex and age bracket and in the correct regional division) are 
available for a few countries only. To circumvent that problem, an 
analysis was first made for some countries for which complete time 
series were available. 
By the method developed by Rogers et al., so-called model 
migration schedules were drawn up: graphs showing what proportion of 
each age bracket makes an interregional move in a certain year. These 
schedules proved very stable through time and on different levels of 
regional division, which gave us confidence to construct similar 
schedules for countries for which the statistical material was poor or 
referred to another year than 1985. From the total outflows and the 
structure of the regional population, for which figures are generally 
available, national schedules that are close enough to reality could 
be drawn up. Figure 7.2 gives a graphic representation of the model 
migration schedules for the individual countries. The X-axis refers to 
the five-year age brackets, the Y-axis to the number per thousand of 
each age bracket who move between the regions of a country - on the 
chosen regional level - in a one-year period. 
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Figure 7.2. Model Migration Schedules 
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The next step is comparable to the procedure followed for 
regional death and fertility factors. Application of age-specific 
migration rates according to the national average to the regional 
population structure produces a theoretical total outflow, which may 
be much larger or smaller than the observed one, because the real 
outflow depends not only on the region-specific inclination to move, 
but also on the size of the region and its position among other 
regions. Division of the observed by the theoretical flow produces the 
regional factor, which can be applied to the national age-specific 
migration rates to give a set of regional rates. The factors have been 
calculated for 1985. 
Once the volume of regional outflows is known, only their 
direction remains to be established. A matrix of interregional 
migration flows was drawn up for each country, giving the percentage 
distribution of outflows from that region among all others. From a 
comparison of these matrices through a number of years, a remarkably 
stable pattern emerges for almost all countries. The migration matrix 
for 1985 was used as a code for the division of projected outflows. 
The migration matrices of France and Portugal do not refer to 
1985 but are based on the latest Population Censuses in either country 
(1982 and 1980, respectively). The Greek migration matrix refers to 
1984 and corresponds to data made available by Eurostat; the 
reliability of these figures is questionable, however. 
7.3. The input elements for labour-force projections 
7.3.1. Regional activity rates 
A procedure similar to the one described in 7.2.2 for regional 
death and birth rates has been followed - again for lack of data - for 
the calculation of regional age-specific activity rates. National 
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2) activity rates by age bracket and sex for 1985 , derived from the 
labour-force sample survey, were applied to the regional population to 
generate a theoretical regional labour force. This figure divided by 
the observed labour force yielded a regional factor, which was 
subsequently applied to the national age-specific rates to produce 
regional ones. 
2) 1986 for Spain and Portugal. 
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8. RESULTS OF THE REGIONAL DEMOGRAPHIC PROJECTIONS 
In Chapter 4, the results of two variants of national 
demographic projections were discussed (based, respectively, on stable 
fertility and projected fertility). The latter variant proved to yield 
more acceptable results, which is why projected fertility rates have 
been chosen as basis for the demographic projections on the regional 
level. 
The results will mostly be reproduced graphically, a distinction 
being made between short-term (1990-1995) and long-term (1985-2015) 
population development. No need to explain that in particular the 
long-term projections are relatively uncertain, and had better be 
looked upon as merely indicative of the possible future evolution. The 
short-terra projections, on the contrary, produce more reliable data 
and are a better basis for conclusions. Not only the development of 
overall population growth will be examined, but also the influence of 
interregional migration on the progress of population in the regions. 
Wherever it is meaningful a comparison will be made with the 
results established by DEMETER 1986. For a proper comparison, the maps 
have been designed with the same number and size of classes as in 
1986. However, because the European average has changed, the class 
limits have shifted as well. For that reason, in the comparison with 
DEMETER 1986 not so much the changes in the absolute values of 
variables will be considered as the shifts in respect of the European 
average. 
8.1. Short-term growth 1990-1995 
8.1.1. Overall growth 
The projection indicates that the population of the entire EC-12 
will increase by an average 0.08 per cent a year during the 1990-1995 
period, which is considerably less than the 0.24 per cent estimated 
for the same period in DEMETER 1986. The extreme regional values are 
far apart, while the population of the Dutch province of Flevoland is 
projected to rise by an annual average of 2.5 per cent, that of the 
YD/11533-8 
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Greek region of Ipeiros is expected to decline annually by over 1.5 
per cent. 
From Map 8.1, only a few regions will surpass a yearly growth of 
0.75 per cent. Among them, only Flevoland in the Netherlands, Devon 
and Cornwall in the United Kingdom, and Nisia Anatolikou Aigaiou in 
Greece boast a yearly increase of more than one per cent. Strikingly, 
in most countries the greatest increase can be found in southern and 
coastal regions. Compared to DEMETER 1986, in particular Ireland, the 
Dutch province of Gelderland, and Spanish Andalucía record lower 
growth figures. That lower population growth rates are now projected 
for Ireland is due to the methodological switch to projected 
fertility. The projection for Gelderland cannot be compared with 
previous ones because in the meantime this province has lost part of 
its territory to the new province of Flevoland. 
There are also regions which in the next five years stand to 
experience a clear decline in population. That applies in particular 
to some metropolitan areas (Greater London, Merseyside, West Midlands, 
Hamburg, Bremen, Ile de France, Liguria, etc.). Besides, some regions 
are losing population because in the national context their economic 
prospects are poor. As examples may serve Arnsberg in Germany, Ipeiros 
in Greece, and Alentejo in Portugal. In comparison with DEMETER 1986 
the changed position of West Berlin is especially striking. In 1986 
still expected to decline steeply, this region now belongs to the few 
German regions which in the next five years may expect a rise in 
population. That is partly due to the inflow of migrants, in 
particular East Germans. Map 8.2 will show, however, that the 
turnabout can also be ascribed to changed interregional migration 
behaviour. 
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8.1.2. Interregional migration 
Naturally, short-terra regional population growth is largely 
determined by the prevailing national tendency. Indeed, it depends in 
part on mortality and fertility rates, which, though varying from one 
region to another, mostly show but slight deviations from the national 
average. Nevertheless, regions within one country do show contrasting 
trends, which are largely due to interregional migration. Germany and 
the United Kingdom provide illustrative examples. 
To establish the influence of interregional migration, regional 
projections based on the assumption of no interregional migration have 
been carried out in addition to the regular ones. The results of the 
two projection methods have been compared, the effect of migration 
being expressed in an index figure (100 = no migration). Map 8.2 
reproduces the outcomes. It illustrates that a large proportion of EC-
countries possess distinct attraction and expulsion areas. Only in 
Belgium, Denmark and to a lesser degree Spain does interregional 
migration play a minor role. As already observed before, especially in 
the metropolitan areas within Western Europe the outflow of population 
considerably outpaces the inflow, whereas in particular coastal areas 
and regions with a tight labour market appear to exert great 
attraction on potential migrants. Strikingly, in some countries the 
migration effect can be interpreted as a north-south contrast, with 
the southern parts carrying away the positive effects (United Kingdom, 
France, Spain, Germany). Probably climatological conditions are not 
without influence there. The only clear exception to that tendency is 
Italy, where economic motives seem to favour the north. 
As could be expected, the pattern of map 8.2 is much the same as 
that of DEMETER 1986; nevertheless, some differences are worth 
recording. The changed position of West Berlin has already been 
pointed out; the province of Noord-Holland in the Netherlands and the 
Greek region of Nisia Anatolikou Aigaiou show a similar reversion of 
the migration effect, whereas Baleares in Spain seems to have lost her 
attractiveness. 
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On the other hand, the map shows that interregional migration is 
not invariably responsible for regional growth differences. Although 
the regions in southern Italy, unlike those in the north, all have 
growing populations, yet they are the very ones with a clear negative 
net migration. This confirms the familiar impression of great 
interregional contrasts with respect to birth and death rates in 
Italy. 
8.2. Long-term growth, 1985-2015 
The long-term evolution of the population is illustrated by map 
8.3. Unlike map 8.1, it focuses not on the yearly growth rate but on 
the percentage change which the population volume has undergone in the 
period concerned. By 2015, the population will have declined by almost 
3 per cent in comparison with 1985. DEMETER 1986 still foresaw a 
growth of over 4 per cent for the 1980-2010 period, comparable in 
length to the present study period. The greatest relative increase is 
foreseen for Flevoland (63.6 per cent); at the other end of the scale 
figures Ipeiros with - 40 per cent. A comparison between short-term 
and long-terra growth reveals that the regional proportions remain much 
the same. Regions showing considerable growth are to be found in the 
southern parts of England (Cambridge, Devon, Dorset), Spain (Murcia, 
Andalucía) and France (Languedoc, Provence) next to the Greek Aegean 
islands. Interregional migration is the main source of these 
developments. Decline is strongest in the city-states of Germany 
(Hamburg, Bremen), the economically lagging regions of Germany 
(Arnsberg, Rheinhessen, Saarland), Greece (Ipeiros, Macedonia) and 
Portugal (Alentejo, Centro) and parts of northern Italy (Piemonte, 
Liguria, Friuli). Next to outmigration the outstanding position of 
these regions is caused by relatively low fertility. 
Map 8.4 gives an impression of the interregional migration 
effect in the long run (again expressed as an index figure). 
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8.3. Ageing within the EC 
The results of the national projections had already revealed 
that all countries within the EC are characterised by increasing 
shares of senior citizens (over 65) in total population. In 1985, 13.4 
per cent of the people were older than 65, against an expected 17.3 
per cent in 2010 and 18.9 per cent in 2015. From a comparison of the 
present projection for 2010 with that of DEMETER 1986, the rise is 
faster than previously foreseen (16.2%). 
Map 8.5 reproduces the situation observed in 1985, while map 8.6 
visualises the future (2015). Understandably, map 8.6 exhibits darker 
shades on the whole than map 8.5. The fact stands out that many 
regions in Germany and Northern Italy will be confronted with 
particularly strong ageing tendencies. The regions in the South East 
of France and the North of the United Kingdom on the contrary seem to 
tend to some form of stabilisation. The same two trends were already 
visible in DEMETER 1986. 
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9. RESULTS OF THE REGIONAL LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIONS 
The short-term and long term development of regional labour 
force seems to harmonize for the greater part with the already 
observed trends in the previous chapter. For this rason, only short 
notice will be paid to these developments in the first paragraph. The 
second paragraph deals with an confrontation between the estimated 
labour force growth rates and the realised unemployment rates. 
Finally, in paragraph 9.3 a table will be given containing the most 
vital results of the regional population and labour force projections. 
9.1. Short term and long term growth of the regional labour force 
The total labour force of the EC-12 will increase by roundabout 
.25 per cent a year during the period 1990-1995 (map 9.1). In DEMETER 
1986 for the same period a slightly higher annual increase of .32 per 
cent was estimated. During this period, there are only a few regions 
that experience an annual growth of over 1.5 per cent. Again Flevoland 
is the region with the highest annual increase (2.8 % ) , whereas the 
estimated annual decline of the Ipeiros labour force amounts to 1.8 
per cent. 
For the long term (1985-2015) the volume of the labour force 
within the entire EC-12 is expected to decrease by 2% (map 9.2). A 
deminishing growth is foreseen up to around the end of the century, 
after which decline sets in. Compared to the short term development 
growth, map 9.2 shows an overall equal picture with only minor shifts. 
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9.2. Job requirements 
A main issue for regional policy is the reduction of socio-
economic disparities between regions. One of the key variables in this 
context is the regional unemployment level. A growing labour force is 
in need of an equally growing job capacity to maintain at least the 
present unemployment and is in need of a faster growing one to reduce 
it. 
The present position of the regions in this respect can be 
assessed by combining the unemployment levels of 1989 with projected 
labour force growth for the period 1990-1995. Regional unemployment 
levels for april 1989 were calculated by Eurostat following the ILO 
concepts used for the labour force sample surveys 
For the EC12 as a whole unemployment at the beginning of 1989 
amounted to 9.3% of the active population. 
In table 9.1 the regions are grouped according to their 
positioning above or below this average and according to the projected 
labour force growth. Table 9.1A contains the regions with a projected 
labour force growth below the EC12 average, while table 9.IB refers to 
region with a growth above the average. 
Thus in table 9.1A regions can be found where the pressure for 
job creation is lowest, while the second page displays regions in a 
rather unfavourable position (especially those on the right). 
The table is displayed graphically in map 9.3, which clearly 
shows that the problem regions in this respect are scattered all over 
Europe, but that apart from Ireland and the Netherlands the 
Mediterranean countries are in the most vulnerable position. Of course 
the size of the unemployment at the starting point (1989) is of main 
importance. The real pressure in the projection period is not all that 
certain as apart from the projected growth of the labour force a large 
role is played by developments of employment opportunities. In general 
one can note that these tend to go in the same direction as labour 
force developments, a certain amount of interdependency being present, 
1) Greece 1987. 
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but that the size of employment growth is smaller, thus leading to 
increasing pressure in those regions where labour force growth will be 
high. 
Comparing the regional classification in the table to the 
situation in 1986 it becomes clear that most regions remain in the 
same category, especially where it concerns the extreme cases. 
Nonetheless a number of changes can be noticed. As the 
classification is based on two variables, labour force growth in the 
period 1990-1995 and the unemployment level at the start of this 
period, both can influence the position within the schedule. Moreover 
even when both factors remain unchanged, a change of position is 
possible as the classification is relative to the (changed) EC 
average. 
As a result a number of German regions have switched to a class 
with lower than average labour force growth. The same applies to some 
Greek regions. In about half of the Spanish regions projected labour 
force growth (in 1986 below average) now is higher than the EC 
average. For many of the UK regions the same phenomenon occurs, while 
in between unemployment in large parts of the UK has dropped below 
average. In most of the French regions the unemployment situation is 
worse than in 1986 and now above average, while in the Netherlands 
unemployment dropped considerably. Finally a few Italian regions show 
higher unemployment especially in the lagging parts like Abruzzi an 
Molise. In general though the overall picture has not changed much. 
88 -












































































oyment rate, 1989 
Unemployment 
WEST MIDLANDS -0.62 
LIGURIA -0.57 
BREMEN -1.22 
DURHAM, CLEVELAND -0.37 











X of EC population 17,7 2,9 

































VEST FOR STOREBAELT 
DERBY-, NOTTINGHAMSHIRE 
ANTWERPEN 
OEST FOR STOREBAELT 
BRABANT 
GREATER MANCHESTER 
GWENT, S, M, W-GLAMORGAN 
HUMBERSIDE 











































































Dyment rate, 1989 
Unemp 







NORTH., TYNE & WEAR 
LIEGE 











































HEREF. & WORC, WARW.SH. 
NORTH YORKSHIRE 
LEIC-, NORTH.SHIRE 






PELOPONNISOS KAI DYTIKI 
CHESHIRE 
LINCOLNSHIRE 






































































































































































t of EC population 14,2 16,0 
91 






DORSET, SOMERSET 1.14 
CAMBR., NORFOLK, SUFFOLK 1.19 
MADEIRA 1.49 
DEVON, CORNWALL 1.51 
NISIA ANATOLIKOU AIGAIOU 2.20 
LISBOA E YALE DO TEJO 0.91 
UTRECHT 0.98· 















































































M a p 9 . 3 . R e g i o n a l p o s i t i o n r e g a r d i n g job r e q u i r e m e n t s 
1 9 9 0 - 1 9 9 5 
υ nem p l o y m e n I 
r a l o 1 9 B 9 
9 ■) 
9 . 3 
9 . 3 
I a Β ο υ ι I u ι c o 
g ruw I li r a i n 
1 <J 9 O - 19 9 5 
0 2 5 
0 2 6 
- o a l i 
- 0 3 6 
- 0 H5 
0 8 5 
- 0 B5 
0 2 6 
- 0 3 6 
- 0 2 6 CD 
ro 
- 0 3 5 
EC12 - 9 3 t C t ? · 0 25 
93 
9.3. Detailed regional results 
Table 9.2 summarizes the most vital results of the regional 
projections as it gives the growth rates by region for population and 
labour force. 
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Annex 4.2. Population pyramids, absolute (xlOOO) and shares (%) 
(projected fertility) 
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In the course of the end of 1989 and the first half of 
1990 the Netherlands Economic Institute, on behalf of the Commission 
of the European Communities, carried out population and labour force 
projections up to 2015 for the regions (NUTS-level II) of the EC. Use 
was made of the DEMETER projection model, developed in 1985. The base 
year for the projections was 1985, the most recent year for which 
sufficiently detailed and reliable data for all countries are 
available. 
During the course of this project the political map of Europe 
changed as a result of developments in Eastern Europe, finally leading 
to the unification of the Bundesrepublik Deutschland and the Deutsche 
Demokratische Republik. As a result the former GDR became part of the 
EC. In consequence a population projection for the extended Community 
became necessary. At the same time migration flows from east to west 
made new calculations necessary for the regions in the former FRG. 
2. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology followed is essentially the same as in the main 
project. However, one important adaptation to the model had to be 
made. The DEMETER model does not take account of international 
migration, because of the fact that the relative importance of 
international migration flows is minor for most of the countries. For 
convenience in the present project both parts of Germany are treated 
as separate countries with a module being added for the calculation 




It can be stated with certainty that the former GDR will be 
faced with many changes. The movement form a centrally-planned to a 
market economy is without precedent. The far-reaching changes which 
this implies are complicated by the simultaneous effects of German 
unification. The effects in social, economic and demographic terms are 
therefore extremely difficult to predict. In view of the 
uncertainties, the present projection begins with the single 
simplifying assumption that demographic patterns in the East will 
converge on those in the West over time (the "convergence 
assumption"). An additional assumption regarding future migration 
flows was necessary for which the work of DIW, itself based on recent 
experience in this regard, was used. In view of the uncertainty 
surrounding such assumptions the projections after the year 2000 need 
to be treated with particular caution. 
The input elements for the population projection are fertility 
rates, death rates and migration flows. 
The fertility pattern in the base year is quite different in 
the former FRG and the former GDR, respectively. East German fertility 
rates in the lower age brackets are substantially higher than in West 
Germany. The reverse is true for the age brackets above 30. An 
explanation can be found in the differing life styles (leisure time, 
consumption patterns etc.) and in the relative security offered by a 
centrally guided economic system especially in relation to the 
extensive facilities for child care in the GDR which made it easier 
for young women to combine motherhood with work. Following the 
convergence assumption, this situation is expected to change although 
it is likely to take some time. Total convergence therefore is assumed 
for 2040. 
Though mortality in the GDR is generally higher than in the FRG, 
differences are relatively small. Convergence by the year 2015 has 
been assumed. 
The largest uncertainty lies in the projection of migration 
flows. In this regard, much depends on the way the unification process 
YD/T1533C.sum 
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evolves. The Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung have 
developed two scenario's for migration flows up to 2040. The first 
assumes a fast adaptation process in which both economies converge 
relatively rapidly in productivity, level of wages, consumption 
patterns etc., while the second is less optimistic and presupposes a 
slower adaptation process. As a result migration flows in the coming 
years are larger in the second scenario. 
Data available since the DIW scenarios were constructed suggest 
that the second is closer to reality. In addition, in the course of 
1990 assessments of the infrastructural and other needs of the GDR 
economy in order to converge on that in FRG have tended to increase, 
again suggesting a slow adaptation process. It is therefore this 
second scenario which has been used in the present projection for 
illustrative purposes, together with a variant which shows the 
comparative position where no migration takes place. 
The main input for the labour force projection is the level of 
activity rates. In the base year situation these are clearly different 
for the GDR. Most striking is the fact that female overall activity is 
practically at the same very high level as male activity. About half 
of the GDR labour force is constituted by women (1989). The statistics 
should, however, be treated with some caution since regime differences 
between centrally-planned and market economics result in differences 
in definitions. 
Following the convergence assumption GDR activity rates are 
projected to convergence towards those in the FRG level in the long 
run. At the same time, given past experience, it seems reasonable to 
expect activity rates in East Germany to remain somewhat above the new 
German average. For this reason the East German activity rate has been 
assumed to converge on that of Oberbayern, where the activity rate is 
the highest in FRG. To show the importance of the assumed changes in 
future activity rates in the GDR for the development of the labour 
force a variant is provided where activity rates are held constant. 
YD/T1533C.sum 
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RESULTS OF THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS 
a) GDR 
On the basis of the convergence assumption outlined above, the GDR 
population is expected to decline in the period 1990-2000 by 11% 
and in the period 2000-2015 by another 10%. In terms of absolute 
figures this means that during the period 1990-2015 the total 
population of the GDR decreases from 16,2 million inhabitants to 
13,1 million. Of particular note is that the main part of this 
decline is attributable to the effects of outmigration. 
As the outmigrating people in general belong to the age groups in 
the active years the effect is one of a "greying" process, i.e. 
ageing of population, which is stronger than in the rest of 
the EC countries. 
GDR labour force is expected to decline in the period 1990-1995 by 
9% and in the period 1995-2000 by another 5%. This means a 
reduction of the labour force of over one million persons (8,9 
million in 1990 v.s. 7,7 million in 2000). For the male labour 
force where outmigration is the main constituting factor the 
figures for the two periods are respectively 6% and 3%. Decline for 
the female labour force is much larger and amounts to figures of 
respectively 12% and 7%. Again an important role is played by 
outmigration, although the effect of falling activity rates, 
especially for women, is important. 
b) FRG 
The population projection for the FRG regions assuming no migration 
inflows from the GDR was characterised in almost every case 
(exceptions: parts of Baden-Wurttemberg, Bayern and West-Berlin) by 
declining populations and labour force. This picture is changed 
significantly by GDR migrants. In the coming period 1990-1995 the 
historical trend towards population decline is brought to a halt or 
changes to growth in most regions. The highest growth is foreseen 
for West-Berlin (0.8% annually). The same general trends apply to 
labour force although the age composition of the migrating 
YD/T1533C.sum 
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population (in terms of the numbers of working age) means that the 
growth effects are even stronger. Again West-Berlin shows the 





A la fin de l'année 1989 et au premier semestre 1990, l'Institut 
économique néerlandais a établi pour le compte de la Commission des 
Communautés européennes des projections en matière de population générale 
et de population active jusqu'à l'horizon 2015 pour les régions 
communautaires du niveau NUTS II. Il a utilisé à cet effet le modèle de 
projections DEMETER, élaboré en 1985. Les projections ont été réalisées sur 
la base de l'année 1985, la plus récente pour laquelle on disposât de 
données assez détaillées et assez fiables pour tous les pays concernés. 
Au cours de la réalisation de cette étude, la carte politique de 
l'Europe a été modifiée par les événements survenus en Europe de l'est, 
événements qui ont finalement débouché sur l'unification de la république 
fédérale d'Allemagne et de la république démocratique allemande. C'est 
ainsi que l'ex-RDA est devenue une partie de la CE, d'où la nécessité d'une 
projection embrassant la population de la Communauté élargie. Dans le même 
temps, compte tenu des flux migratoires orientés d'est en ouest, il a fallu 
effectuer de nouveaux calculs pour les régions de 1'ex-république fédérale 
d'Allemagne. 
2. METHODOLOGIE 
La méthodologie suivie est de même essence que celle utilisée dans le 
projet principal. Le modèle a dû toutefois faire l'objet d'une adaptation 
importante. Le modèle DEMETER ne tient pas compte des migrations 
internationales, car les flux migratoires internationaux ont une importance 
mineure pour la plupart des pays. Pour des raisons de commodité, les deux 
parties de l'Allemagne sont traitées dans le présent projet comme des pays 
distincts et un module spécifique sert à calculer la densité et la 
distribution des flux migratoires futurs entre les deux territoires. 
HYPOTHESES 
Il est permis d'affirmer que l'ex-RDA sera confrontée à de nombreux 
changements. Le passage de la planification étatique de l'économie à une 
économie de marché n'a aucun précédent. Les profonds changements inhérents 
à ce processus sont encore compliqués par les effets concomitants de la 
réunification allemande. Les conséquences d'ordre social, économique ou 
démographique sont donc extrêmement difficiles à prévoir. Etant donné ces 
incertitudes, l'hypothèse simplificatrice retenue est que les lignes de 
forces des démographies respectives de l'Est et de l'Ouest convergeront 
progressivement ("hypothèse de convergence"). En ce qui concerne les flux 
migratoires futurs, il est apparu nécessaire de retenir une hypothèse 
supplémentaire pour laquelle on a utilisé les travaux du DIW, eux-mêmes 
fondés sur l'expérience acquise dans un passé récent. Compte tenu des 
incertitudes inhérentes à des hypothèses de ce genre, une grande prudence 
s'impose quant aux projections qui vont au-delà de l'horizon 2000. 
Les éléments saisis pour établir la projection en matière de 
population sont les taux de fécondité, les taux de mortalité et les flux 
migratoires. 
Pendant l'année de base, la fécondité enregistrée dans 1'ex-RFA 
différait beaucoup de celle observée dans l'ex-RDA. Les taux de fécondité 
est-allemands dans les jeunes classes d'âge sont nettement plus élevés que 
ceux de l'Allemagne de l'ouest. C'est l'inverse qui est vrai chez les plus 
de 30 ans. Cette situation peut être expliquée par les différences existant 
en matière de style de vie (loisirs, modèles de consommation, etc.) et par 
la relative sécurité qu'offre un système économique centralisé, notamment 
les larges facilités dont bénéficiaient les jeunes femmes en RDA pour 
s'occuper de leurs enfants et pour concilier maternité et vie active. Dans 
le cadre de l'hypothèse de convergence, cette situation est appelée à se 
modifier, mais il est probable que le processus s'étalera sur une assez 
longue période, car on prévoit la convergence totale seulement pour l'an 
2040. 
Bien que la mortalité soit généralement plus élevée dans la RDA que 
dans la RFA, les différences sont relativement faibles. La convergence en 
la matière est prévue pour 2015. 
La plus grande incertitude réside dans la projection des flux 
migratoires. A cet égard, cela dépendra de la manière dont évoluera le 
processus d'unification. 
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Le "Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung" a élaboré deux 
scénarios concernant les flux migratoires jusqu'en 2040. Le premier suppose 
un processus d'adaptation accéléré, à la faveur duquel les deux économies 
convergent assez rapidement en matière de productivité, niveau de salaire, 
structure de consommation, etc.; le second, moins optimiste, suppose au 
contraire un processus d'adaptation plus lent. Il en résulte que les flux 
migratoires pour les années à venir sont plus importants dans ce second 
scénario. 
Les données postérieures à l'élaboration des scénarios du DIW donnent 
à penser que la seconde hypothèse est la plus proche de la réalité. A noter 
en outre que les évaluations faites en 1990 ont eu tendance à sous-estimer · 
l'effort de rattrapage nécessaire, notamment en matière d'infrastructure 
pour que l'économie de la RDA converge avec celle de la RFA, observation 
qui laisse présager encore une fois un processus d'adaptation lent. C'est 
pourquoi on a utilisé le second scénario afin de bien faire apparaître 
l'évolution, tout en présentant une variante qui montre ce que serait la 
situation en l'absence de mouvements migratoires. 
La principale donnée mise en compte pour la projection de la 
population active est le niveau des taux d'activité, lesquels se 
différenciaient nettement des taux ouest-allemands pendant l'année de base 
pour la RDA. Le fait le plus frappant est que le taux d'activité féminin se 
situe presque au même niveau que le taux d'activité masculin, lui-même très 
élevé. Les femmes représentent environ la moitié de la population active de 
la RDA (1989). Il convient toutefois de considérer ces données avec une 
certaine circonspection, car les différences entre des régimes 
respectivement fondés sur une planification centrale et sur l'économie de 
marché débouchent sur des définitions différentes elles aussi. 
Dans l'hypothèse de convergence, les taux d'activité de la RDA sont 
projetés dans la perspective d'une convergence à long terme au niveau 
spécifique de la RFA. Compte tenu de l'expérience acquise dans le passé, il 
semble néanmoins raisonnable de s'attendre à ce que les taux d'activité en 
Allemagne de l'Est restent légèrement supérieurs à la nouvelle moyenne 
allemande. Aussi a-t-on retenu l'hypothèse que le taux d'activité 
est-allemand convergerait pour s'aligner sur celui de la Haute-Bavière, 
dont le taux d'activité est le plus élevé enregistré dans la RFA. Pour 
mieux montrer l'importance que revêtent les modifications présumées en 
matière de taux d'activité future dans la RDA pour l'évolution de la 
population active, on a présenté une variante dans laquelle les taux 
­ χ ­
α'activité demeurent constants. 
4. RESULTATS DES PROJECTIONS EN MATIERE DE POPULATION 
a) RDA 
Sur la base de l'hypothèse de convergence précédemment exposée, la 
population de la RDA devrait baisser de 11 % entre 1990 et 2000 et de 10% 
encore entre 2000 et 2015. Autrement dit, la population totale de la RDA 
tomberait en valeur absolue de 16,2 à 13,1 millions d'habitants pendant la 
période 1990­2015. Il est à noter que cette régression serait 
essentiellement due aux effets de l'émigration. L'émigration étant le plus 
souvent le fait de personnes en âge de travailler, il en résulte un 
vieillissement de la population plus prononcé que dans les autres pays de 
la Communauté européenne. 
La population active de la RDA devrait régresser de 9 % entre 1990 et 
1995 et encore de 5 % entre 1995 et l'an 2000. Le nombre des actifs 
baisserait ainsi de plus de 1 million (tombant de 8,9 millions en 1990 à 
7,7 millions en l'an 2000). En ce qui concerne la seule population active 
masculine, qui est aussi la plus touchée par l'émigration, les chiffres 
correspondants pour les deux périodes précitées s'établissent 
respectivement à 6 % et 3 %. La régression de la population active féminine 
est beaucoup plus importante (respectivement de 12 % et 7 % ) . Là encore, 
l'émigration joue un rôle important, mais la baisse des taux d'activité, 
surtout chez les femmes, est elle aussi lourde de conséquences. 
b) RFA 
Dans l'hypothèse excluant tout flux migratoire en provenance de 
l'ex­RDA, la projection en matière de population fait apparaître pour la 
quasi­totalité des régions de la RFA (certains secteurs du Bade­Wurtemberg, 
la Bavière et Berlin­Ouest étant les seules exceptions) une régression de 
la population et une diminution du nombre des actifs. Le tableau est 
sensiblement modifié si l'on tient compte de l'émigration en provenance de 
l'ex­RDA. Au cours de la période 1990­1995, la tendance historique à la 
baisse de la population est enrayée ou même fait place à une progression 
dans la plupart des régions. La croissance la plus élevée est prévue pour 
Berlin­Ouest (0,8 % par an). Les mêmes tendances générales caractérisent 
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1'évolution de la population active, encore que quant à l'âge, la 
composition de la population migrante (sous le rapport du nombre des 
personnes en âge de travailler) soit telle qu'il en résulte une croissance 
plus élevée encore. En l'occurrence, c'est toujours pour Berlin-ouest que 




In 1985 the Netherlands Economic Institute was approached by the 
Commission of the European Communities with the request to carry out 
projections of national and regional population for the member 
countries of the EC and for the regions at the NUTS level II. At that 
time the projection horizon was 2010. In addition to population 
projections a translation had to be made to labour force at the 
regional level and to job requirements in the period to come. 
Recently, the Commission charged NEI with an update of the results of 
this project and an extension of the projection period to 2015. 
During the course of this updating dramatic changes took place 
in the countries of Eastern Europe, finally leading to a merging of 
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR) into one unified Germany. A consequence of this 
political development was the entry of the former GDR regions into the 
EC. A population and labour force projection for this area thus became 
necessary. Due to the expected internal migration flows within 
Germany, strongly dependent on economic developments, it was also 
necessary to reconsider the future picture for the former West-German 
regions. 
In the present report a description is given of the assumptions 
underlying the projections. It should be stressed that the 
unprecedented nature of the changes mean that considerable uncertainty 
exists as to the way the merging process will develop. 
Use was made of scenario's set up by the Deutsches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW) in june 1990, especially for migration 
flows. It should also be borne in mind that doubts exist about the 
comparability of GDR statistics. This is especially the case for 
participation in the labour force, the measurement of which has had 
policical undertones. 
It can be stated with certainty, that the former GDR will be 
faced with many changes. At the present time the exact extent of these 
changes is hard to foresee. For the projection over the long term, the 
underlying assumption was therefore made that the behavioural patterns 
represented by the input-elements in the projection model for a 
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unified Germany will reflect a tendency towards convergence between 
East and West over the period up to 2015 (the convergence assumption). 
The present document reports on the projections for the former 
GDR, the effects for the West-German regions and the changes expected 
for the total of Germany. In the text the terms FRG, GDR and NEWGER 
are used for the former Bundesrepublik, the former Demokratische 
Republik and the unified Germany. 
Chapter 2 discusses the input elements needed for the 
projections for a unified Germany. In the case of the FRG the only 
difference in the inputs compared to the main study lies in the 
addition of internal migration flows during the period 1990-2015. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present the results of the population and the labour 




2. THE INPUT ELEMENTS 
2.1. Base-year population: data source 
The data for the GDR population by sex and age groups for the 
base year 1985 were derived from the "Statistisches Jahrbuch der 
Deutschen Demokratischen Republik". The same source provided data on 
past developments in fertility and death rates. 
2.2. Migration between FRG and GDR 
The methodology assumes continuing migration flows from East to 
West, using the projections of the DIW. The DIW has developed two 
scenarios for possible migration flows up to 2040. The first supposes 
a relatively fast adaptation process with relatively rapid convergence 
in productivity, level of wages, consumption patterns etc. The second 
scenario is less optimistic and presupposes a slower adaptation 
process. As a result, migration flows under the second scenario in 
coming years are somewhat larger, especially in the early 1990's. 
On the basis of the recent evidence the choice was made to use 
the second migration scenario which is set out in Table 2.1. Recent 
estimates suggest that in the first half of 1990 about 250.000 people 
migrated from the former GDR to the West. 
Table 2.1. Net migration GDR - FRG by period (x 1000) 
1990 - 1994 1100 
1995 - 1999 320 
2000 - 2004 180 
2005 - 2009 150 
2010 - 2014 130 
Source: DIW 
The disaggregation of the migration flow by sex and age groups 
has been based on the observed division in the period 1985-1989, as 
provided by the Bundesausgleichsamt. The geographical distribution of 
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these migrants settling in the FRG regions is based on the same source 
with the exception of West Berlin 
By assuming a persistence of the settlement pattern of recent 
years, West Berlin would be confronted with an inflow of more than 
400.000 people in the period 1985-2015. Relative to a population of 
about 2 million this seems unreasonably high and would lead to 
pressure on the housing and labourmarkets beyond that which would be 
permitted. For this reason it was decided to limit the projected total 
inflow into West Berlin, over the period 1985-2015, to 200.000 people. 
This assumption is related to the most recently available figures, 
where in the first half of 1990 about 6500 people moved from the GDR 
to West Berlin. Hence a projection of about 70.000 in the period 1990-
1994 seems to be in line with this figure (see annex table Al). The 
statistical surplus of people, which would have been allocated to West 
Berlin (i.e. 200.000 people) was allocated to the other FRG regions in 
relation to the previous pattern of geographical flows. The regional 
distribution is given in the annex. 
2.3. Fertility 
Present fertility in the GDR is substantially higher than in the 
FRG. An important reason for this phenomenon can be found in policy 
measures. It is to be expected that unification will lead to a 
decrease of fertility especially in the lower age brackets. DIW 
mentions a number of reasons, principally: 
- no new measures will be taken for the stimulation of family growth; 
- the introduction of a market economy with less security (risks of 
unemployment etc.) will lower the disposition to have children; 
- new opportunities (travel, consumption patterns) will lead to a 
tendency to have children at a higher age; 
1) No information was available regarding the region of origin of the 
migrants from the GDR. 
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- present facilities for child care (kindergarten etc.) will be less 
abundant and more expensive for the parents. 
Regarding fertility the underlying assumption for the 
projections is one of convergence to levels projected for the FRG. 
This means a relatively sharp decline in the lower age brackets and a 
slight upward trend in the higher age brackets. Current differences in 
some age groups are, however, rather large and complete convergence is 
therefore likely to occur over a long period of time. The assumption 
was made that total convergence is reached in 2040. For the projection 
period (to 2015) this means that a difference will persist between 
both Germany's, where the lower age brackets show higher but 
diminishing fertility in the GDR. The reverse is true for the ages 
over 30. The projected figures are presented in the annex (Figure 
A.l). 
2.4. Death-rates 
In the GDR mortality is generally higher than in the FRG, 
although the difference is not large. Assuming that medical care will 
improve and environmental conditions will become more favourable, 
convergence to FRG levels seems appropriate (annex, table A.2). 
2.5. Activity rates 
The Institut für Soziologie und Sozialpolitik der Akademie der 
Wissenschaften der DDR (Sozialreport 1990) has estimated activity 
rates for the year 1989 by sex and age group. In the present 
projection, these activity rates have been assumed constant for the 
years 1985 to 1990. 
Activity rate statistics should, however, be treated with some 
caution. It is not at all certain that definitions of active 
population are in line with the definitions used by Eurostat (ILO) for 
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the EC member states, given the fundamental differences between market 
and centrally guided economies. 
A most striking feature is the fact that female overall (15-60) 
activity rates in the GDR are at the same (high) level as male 
activity and much higher than in western economies. This undoubtedly 
reflects regime differences where the provision of employment in 
centrally-guided economies has been unconstrained by the need for 
enterprises to be profitable as in the West. In particular, extensive 
facilities for child care were provided by enterprises in the GDR to 
enable women to go to work. 
Given convergence in the economic and institutional structures 
in both parts of Germany, convergence of activity rates towards those 
in the FRG can be expected at least in the long run. It seems likely 
however, that as a result of past experience, female activity rates in 
the East will remain above the average in a unified Germany. 
Consequently the assumption has been made that projected activity 
rates will converge on those for the FRG region with highest rates 
i.e. Oberbayern. 
The precise rates used for the labour force projections are 
shown in the annex (Table A.3). 
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RESULTS OF THE POPULATION PROJECTIONS 
3.1. National results 
3.1.1. GDR and FRG 
For the GDR and FRG p r o j e c t i o n s were made on t h e assumption of 
p ro j ec t ed f e r t i l i t y - and d e a t h - r a t e s . Bes ides , an a d d i t i o n a l 
p r o j e c t i o n was made for the GDR assuming s t a b l e (1985- leve l ) r a t e s . 
Absolute f i gu re s for both v a r i a n t s are given in t a b l e 3 . 1 . 
Table 3 . 1 . Population projection GDR (x 1000) 
total males females 
1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 
Stable GDR 16223 14576 13429 7737 7061 6554 8486 7515 6875 
Projected GDR 16223 14497 13100 7737 7009 6348 8486 7488 6753 
Projected FRG 61672 61417 55549 29598 29665 26748 32074 31753 28801 
Regarding t h e f i gu re s of the GDR, in comparison t o t o t a l dec l i ne 
of t h e popula t ion the d i f f e r ence between t h e v a r i a n t s i s only of minor 
importance, r e f l e c t i n g the fac t t h a t i t i s t h e assumption rega rd ing 
ou tmigra t ion which i s t h e more important f a c t o r de termining fu tu re 
popula t ion in the GDR. 
The ageing of popula t ion t y p i c a l of Western c o u n t r i e s i s a l so 
found in t h e GDR r e f l e c t i n g t h e e f f e c t s of lower f e r t i l i t y and higher 
l i f e expectancy. For t h e GDR t h e ageing of popu la t ion w i l l a l s o be 
inc reased by the fac t t h a t t he outflow of migrants from t h e GDR 
c o n s i s t s l a r g e l y of people in the a c t i v e (younger) age groups . As a 
r e s u l t t h e r e w i l l be a s t rong tendency toward a greying popu la t ion as 
shown in t a b l e 3 .2 . 
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Table 3.2. Demographic pressure in GDR (all figures expressed as % of 
15-59) 
Age group 1985 2015 
0 - 1 4 30.9 23.9 
60+ 29.6 42.1 
total 60.5 65.4 
3 . 1 . 2 . Unified Germany (NEWGER) 
The e f f e c t of migra t ion flows w i l l have a p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y 
smal le r in f luence on FRG popula t ion than t h a t recorded for t h e GDR as 
a r e s u l t of abso lu te d i f f e rences in s i z e . 
Table 3.3 provides growth f igures for t h e FRG with inflow only 
for t h e per iod 1985 - 1990 (as p ro jec ted in t h e main study) and for 
the s i t u a t i o n with migrat ion occurr ing dur ing 1985 - 2015 for the FRG, 
GDR and the un i f i ed Germany. For the Western p a r t of Germany i t shows 
t h a t nega t ive growth f igu res (compared t o those assuming no 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l migrat ion a f t e r 1990) w i l l become sma l l e r . For t h e male 
popula t ion in t h e per iod 1990 - 2000 growth even becomes p o s i t i v e . 
Table 3.3. Annual growth rates population (X) and the absolute population un i f i ed Germany 
to ta l males females 
1990/ 2000/ 1990/ 1990/ 2000/ 1990/ 1990/ 2000/ 1990/ 
2000 2015 2015 2000 2015 2015 2000 2015 2015 
Without migration 





Total population (x1000) 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 






























3.2. Regional assumptions and results 
3.2.1. GDR 
As in most countries interregional migration flows within the 
GDR show a fairly stable pattern. In the past decade there has been a 
constant net outflow from the rural areas and from the old industrial 
concentrations. Net migration for the GDR-Bezirke is given in table 
3.4 for the years 1985 to 1988 in absolute figures and per thousand of 
the resident population. 





















































































































































Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR. 
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Positive net migration is relatively (very) high in East­
2) Berlin . The only other region with a positive balance (althouç 
limited) is the more modern industrial area of Gera. 
3.2.2. FRG 
Table 3.5 summarizes the most vital results of the regional 
projections for the former FRG as it gives growth rates for the short 
term 1990 ­1995 (annual rate) in column la for the situation with 
migration and in column lb for the situation without migration from 
the GDR. Population growth as a % change over the period 1985 ­ 2015 
is given in columns 2a and 2 b. 
In table 3.6 the indexes for the effects of migration are given 
as described in paragraph 8.1.2 and 8.1.4 of the main report. The 
former projection (with interregional migration) and the present one 
(with interregional + inflow from GDR) are compared with the base 
projection assuming no migration (interregional and international) at 
all to show the importance of the migration projections for the FRG 
and its regions. 
2) In the present projection the GDR has been treated as one region. 
If projections had been made at the level of Bezirke, under the 
DEMETER methodology a stable migration pattern would have been 
assumed. This would mean a continuing net flow into East­Berlin of 
about 20.000 people yearly. In combination with the flows from the 
GDR into West­Berlin and the flows from FRG regions into West­
Berlin, and taking account of the natural population decline, 
population in the total Berlin area would grow in the period 1990 
to 2010 with some 5%, which is similar to the figure arrived at 
by a DIW projection for the combined Berlin area as well. (DIW 
Wochenbericht 27/90, July 1990). 
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Table 3.6. Migration effect 


































































































































































FRG 100.0 101.8 100.0 103.7 
a) 
b) 
(Population 1995 including interregional and excluding 
international migration)/(population 1995 excluding interregional 
and international migration) χ 100. 
(Population 1995 including interregional and international 
migration)/(population 1995 excluding interregional and 
international migration) χ 100. 
c) (Population 2015 including interregional and excluding 
international migration)/(population 2015 excluding interregional 
and international migration) χ 100. 
d) (Population 2015 including interregional and international 
migration)/(population 2015 excluding interregional and 
international migration) χ 100. 
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4. RESULTS OF THE LABOUR FORCE PROJECTIONS 
4.1. GDR "national" level 
Starting from the population projection based on projected 
fertility- and death-rates two variants were considered for labour 
force: the first with stable activity rates (level 1989), the second 
with activity rates converging on the level of Oberbayern, the region 
with the highest activity in the FRG. 
Absolute figures are given in table 4.1. 

































From this table it becomes clear that change in the labour force 
is most outstanding for females which is due to the anticipated 
decline in activity rates following the convergence assumption. For 
the male labour force the major component of decline is the 
outmigration. This component also plays an important role in the 
decline of the female labour force as well, although the lowering of 
activity rates is relatively stronger, as shown in table 4.2. As 
discussed above, the future of female activity rates in the GDR is 
surrounded by some uncertainty. The projections after the year 2000 
need to be treated with particular care in this regard. Up to the year 
2000, the overall labour force projection is less sensitive to the 
effects of the assumption on projected activity rates. 
YD/T1533C 
-14-
Table 4.2. Total change volume labour force in the GDR and its 
components (1990-2000, %) 
male female total 
change due to: 
death rates projection + 0.4 + 0.7 + 0.6 
activity rates projection - 1.1 - 6.4 - 3.7 
migration -10.7 -10.0 -10.4 
*~ãT~ 
total change ' - 9.4 -18.3 -13.8 
a) Because of interaction between the three components, the total 
change is not equal to the summons of these components. 
4.2. Unified Germany (NEWGER) 
Table 4.3 provides growth figures of the labour force for the 
FRG, GDR and the unified Germany (with and without migration flows). 
The absolute size of the labour force in the unified Germany is 
presented in table 4.4. All figures are based on the central variant 
which contains projected fertility-, death- and activity-rates. 
As a consequence of the "international" migration, the GDR 
labour force shows a much sharper decline. In particular, the decrease 
of the female labour force is rather large. Of course the FRG labour 
force shows opposite (although less profound) trends. The relative 
size of the decrease of the labour force of the unified Germany is 




Table 4.3. Total period change (X) labour force 
total males females 







































NEWGER -2.3 -3.6 -5.9 •1.4 -3.0 -4.4 -3.6 -4.6 -8.0 
Table 4 .4 . Labour force project ion un i f ied Germany (x 1000) 
to ta l 
1990 2000 2015 
males 
1990 2000 2015 
females 
1990 2000 2015 
Projected 38593 36322 31882 22501 21516 19134 16092 14805 12748 
4 . 3 . FRG reg iona l e f f e c t s 
Table 4.5 summarizes the most v i t a l r e s u l t s of the r e g i o n a l 
p r o j e c t i o n s . The shor t term (1990 -1995) annual growth r a t e s a re given 
in t h e f i r s t column for t h e s i t u a t i o n with migra t ion and in t h e second 
column for the s i t u a t i o n without migra t ion from the GDR. Labour force 
growth as a % change over the per iod 1985 -2015 i s given in columns 3 
( i n c l . migra t ion) and 4 ( exc l . m i g r a t i o n ) . 
All f igu res are based on p r o j e c t i o n s assuming i n t e r r e g i o n a l 
m ig ra t i on . 
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Figure A.l. Projected age-specific fertility rates up to 2015 in the 
GDR 
age bracket 15-19 
100 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 
West Germany — I — East Germany 
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Table Α . 2 . P reva i l i ng death-rates up to 1985 and projected death- ra tes up to 2015 in the GDR 
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Table Α.3. Project ion of ac t i v i t y - r a tes in the GDR (convergence to Oberbayern-level in 2015) 
a l l ages 
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